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IMMIGRATION SURVEILLANCE 
ANIL KALHAN* 
ABSTRACT 
 In recent years, immigration enforcement levels have soared, 
yielding a widely noted increase in the number of noncitizens 
removed from the United States.  Less visible, however, has been 
an attendant sea change in the underlying nature of immigration 
governance itself, hastened by new surveillance and 
dataveillance technologies.  Like many other areas of contempo-
rary governance, immigration control has rapidly become an in-
formation-centered and technology-driven enterprise. At virtually 
every stage of the process of migrating or traveling to, from, and 
within the United States, both noncitizens and U.S. citizens are 
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now subject to collection and analysis of extensive quantities of 
personal information for immigration control and other purposes.  
This information is aggregated and stored by government 
agencies for long retention periods in networks of interoperable 
databases and shared among a variety of public and private 
actors, both inside and outside the United States, with little 
transparency, oversight, or accountability. 
 In this Article, I theorize and assess this underappreciated 
transformation of the techniques and technologies of immigration 
enforcement—their swift proliferation, enormous scale, likely 
entrenchment, and broader meanings.  Situating this 
reconfiguration within a larger set of developments concerning 
surveillance and technology, I explain how these technologies 
have transformed a regime of immigration control, operating 
primarily upon noncitizens at the territorial border, into part of a 
more expansive regime of migration and mobility surveillance, 
operating without geographic bounds upon citizens and 
noncitizens alike.  The technologies that enable this immigration 
surveillance regime can, and do, bring great benefits.  However, 
their unimpeded expansion erodes the practical mechanisms and 
legal principles that have traditionally constrained aggregations 
of power and protected individual autonomy, as similarly 
illustrated in current debates over surveillance in other settings.  
In the immigration context, those constraints have always been 
less robust in the first place.  Accordingly, I urge more 
constrained implementation of these technologies to preserve 
zones where immigration surveillance activities do not take place 
and to ensure greater due process and accountability when they 
do. 
 A complete understanding of immigration enforcement today 
must account for how the evolution of enforcement institutions, 
practices, and meanings has not simply increased the number of 
noncitizens being deported but has effected a more basic 
transformation in immigration governance.  The institutions of 
immigration surveillance are becoming integrated into the 
broader national surveillance state very rapidly.  As that 
reconfiguration proceeds, scholars, policymakers, advocates, and 
community members need to grapple more directly with its 
implications. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the politics of immigration have been in a state of 
considerable flux.  Although only months before the 2012 election the 
Republican Party and its presidential nominee officially embraced policies 
aimed at inducing large-scale “self-deportation” by unauthorized migrants, 
in the wake of the election leading Republicans exhibited a widely noted 
change of heart, facilitating the Senate’s bipartisan adoption of sweeping 
comprehensive immigration reform legislation.1  Since then, legislative 
reform efforts in Congress have stalled, leaving the prospects for significant 
immigration reform legislation deeply uncertain. 
However, even if Congress eventually embraces comprehensive 
immigration reform, the sprawling immigration enforcement system that 
has emerged in recent decades appears certain not just to endure, but to 
extend its reach.  The reform frameworks advanced by the Obama 
Administration and leading members of Congress, while committing to 
legalize millions of unauthorized migrants, all pledge major expansions in 
border security and immigration control.2  Although the particular forms of 
regulation remain in flux, any reforms that occur undoubtedly will include 
an aggressive, continuing commitment to large-scale enforcement 
measures.3 
In this Article, I examine a set of important but underappreciated 
consequences of this entrenchment of mass immigration enforcement, 
tracing and analyzing the evolution of immigration governance into an 
enduring regime of immigration surveillance.4  By any measure, 
                                                          
 1.  Ryan Lizza, Getting to Maybe: Inside the Gang of Eight’s Immigration Deal, NEW 
YORKER, Jun. 24, 2013, at 44; see Anil Kalhan, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications 
of Interior Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1165–67 (2008) (discussing 
“self-deportation”). 
 2.  Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744, 
113th Cong. (as passed by Senate, June 27, 2013); Fact Sheet: Fixing Our Broken Immigration 
System So Everyone Plays by the Rules, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 29, 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/29/fact-sheet-fixing-our-broken-
immigration-system-so-everyone-plays-rules; Text of Republicans’ Principles on Immigration, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1a4AeTh. 
 3.  See, e.g., Marco Rubio, Mis Principios Para Una Reforma Migratoria, LA OPINIÓN (Jan. 
23, 2013), http://www.laopinion.com/marco-rubio-principios-reforma-migratoria (advocating en-
forcement “triggers” as precondition to legalization of unauthorized migrants); Seth Freed Wess-
ler, How Immigration Reform Could Expand Incarceration of Immigrants, COLORLINES (Feb. 6, 
2013), 
http://colorlines.com/archives/2013/02/how_immigration_reform_could_mean_more_incarceratio
n_of_immigrants.html; see also David A. Martin, Eight Myths About Immigration Enforcement, 
10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 525, 526 (2007) (advocating a “stable, enduring, and functional 
enforcement system” as an “indispensable component of viable immigration reform”). 
 4.  JOHN GILLIOM & TORIN MONAHAN, SUPERVISION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 2 (2013) (defining surveillance as involving “systematic monitoring, 
gathering, and analysis of information in order to make decisions, minimize risk, sort populations, 
and exercise power”); DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 14 (2007); Jack M. 
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enforcement levels have soared in recent years.  Federal expenditures on 
border and immigration control have grown fifteen-fold since 1986 and 
now substantially exceed expenditures on all other federal law enforcement 
programs combined.5  These activities have been supplemented by a 
dizzying array of initiatives, often administered by state, local, and private 
actors, that indirectly enforce immigration law by regulating access to 
rights, benefits, and services—including employment, social services, 
driver’s licenses, transportation services, and education—based on 
citizenship or immigration status.6  Increasingly, immigration control 
objectives also are pursued using criminal prosecutions.7 
These initiatives have yielded a staggering, widely noted increase in 
the number of noncitizens formally removed from the United States.8  
Much less widely noted, however, has been the full significance of that 
growth—including an attendant sea change in the underlying nature of 
immigration regulation itself, hastened by the implementation of 
                                                          
Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2008); Gary T. 
Marx, What’s New About the “New Surveillance”? Classifying for Change and Continuity, 1 
SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 9, 18 (2002).  
 5.  DORIS MEISSNER, DONALD M. KERWIN, MUZAFFAR CHISHTI & CLAIRE BERGERON, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A 
FORMIDABLE MACHINERY (2013).  The federal judiciary has also devoted a growing share of its 
resources to adjudicating immigration enforcement cases.  ABA COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, 
REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, 
EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 1-33 & n.242, 
3-21 to 3-26 (2010). 
 6.  Monica Varsanyi, Immigration Policy Activism in U.S. States and Cities: Interdiscipli-
nary Perspectives, in TAKING LOCAL CONTROL: IMMIGRATION POLICY ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES 
AND STATES 1, 3 (Monica Varsanyi ed., 2010); Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment 
of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193 (2007); see 
Kalhan, supra note 1, at 1158–60 (conceptualizing the distinction between direct and indirect en-
forcement mechanisms). 
 7.  Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 
135 (2009); Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281 (2010); David 
Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157 (2012). 
 8.  MARC R. ROSENBLUM, DORIS MEISSNER, CLAIRE BERGERON & FAYE HIPSMAN, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INST., THE DEPORTATION DILEMMA: RECONCILING TOUGH AND HUMANE 
ENFORCEMENT 3–6 (2014); Developments in the Law—Immigrants Rights & Immigration En-
forcement, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1565, 1569–70 (2013); The Great Expulsion, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 
2014, at 23; Adam Goodman, How the Deportation Numbers Mislead, AL JAZEERA AM. (Jan. 24, 
2014), http://alj.am/1avrZQT.  From 1986 to 2012, the annual number of formal removals sky-
rocketed from approximately 25,000 to over 419,000 individuals.  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STATS., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2012 (2013).  Hundreds of 
thousands of noncitizens are detained each year while in removal proceedings or awaiting remov-
al.  Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 44–45 
(2010).  Federal convictions for migration-related crimes have also spiraled upward, from approx-
imately 9,000 in 1986 to over 27,000 by 2010.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 2010 (2012).  While 
more uneven, workplace enforcement of laws barring employment of unauthorized workers also 
has increased.  ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IMMIGRATION-RELATED WORKSITE 
ENFORCEMENT: PERFORMANCE MEASURES 5–13 (2012). 
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transformative new surveillance and dataveillance technologies.  Like many 
other areas of contemporary governance, immigration control has rapidly 
become an information-centered and technology-driven enterprise.  At 
virtually every stage of the process of migrating or traveling to, from, and 
within the United States, both noncitizens and U.S. citizens are now subject 
to collection and analysis of extensive quantities of personal information for 
immigration control and other purposes.  This information is aggregated 
and stored by government agencies for long retention periods in networks 
of interoperable databases and shared among a variety of public and private 
actors, both inside and outside the United States, with little transparency, 
oversight, or accountability.9 
Despite the growing concern about surveillance and data mining in 
other contexts, the development of this immigration surveillance regime has 
received limited attention.10  Although a rich literature assesses shifts in 
immigration law in recent decades, the transformation of enforcement 
practices themselves—understood as a conceptual and programmatic whole, 
rather than a series of discrete programs—remains insufficiently 
examined.11  When analyzing enforcement in systemic terms, scholars have 
emphasized other important concerns, such as the meaning and significance 
of deportation and unlawful presence.12  Observers have carefully examined 
immigration law’s adjudicatory processes and its convergence with criminal 
                                                          
 9.  MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 66 (“Database screening now accompanies virtually 
all key interactions between noncitizens and the federal government.”); Anil Kalhan, Immigration 
Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1105 (2013); Valsamis Mitsilegas, Extraterritorial Immigration Control in the 21st Century: 
The Individual and the State Transformed, in EXTRATERRITORIAL IMMIGRATION CONTROL: 
LEGAL CHALLENGES 39, 39 (Bernard Ryan & Valsamis Mitsilegas eds., 2010); Tamara Vukov & 
Mimi Sheller, Border Work: Surveillant Assemblages, Virtual Fences, and Tactical Counter-
Media, 23 SOC. SEMIOTICS 225 (2013). 
 10.  MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 65 (noting that these technologies have been “trans-
formational” but “ha[ve] not received the attention given to more visible changes”). 
 11.  See Hiroshi Motomura, Choosing Immigrants, Making Citizens, 59 STAN. L. REV. 857, 
870 (2007) (emphasizing the need to “think systematically about . . . immigration law choices”); 
Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Integrated Regime of Immigration Regulation, in WRITING 
IMMIGRATION: SCHOLARS AND JOURNALISTS IN DIALOGUE 44 (Marcelo Suárez-Orozco, Vivian 
Louie, & Roberto Suro eds., 2011) (urging integrated analysis of the “federal-state-local dynamic 
in immigration regulation” as a coherent whole); Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The Political Econ-
omies of Immigration Law, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2012) (highlighting broad areas of conver-
gence among seemingly disparate immigration-related issues). 
 12.  See, e.g., BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY, AND 
IMMIGRATION POLICY (2006); DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE 
NEW AMERICAN DIASPORA (2012); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 
(2014); Stephen Legomsky, Immigration Policy from Scratch: The Universal and the Unique, 21 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 339 (2012); Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1715, 1735–39 (2006); Michael J. Wishnie, Proportionality: The Struggle for Balance in 
U.S. Immigration Policy, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 431 (2011). 
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law norms and practices.13  Scholars also have addressed the significance of 
race, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, and class in 
enforcement practices.14  And a growing body of work explores 
immigration federalism and localism.15 
However, legal scholars have given virtually no attention to the 
revolution taking place in the techniques and technologies of immigration 
enforcement themselves—their swift proliferation, enormous scale, likely 
entrenchment, and broader meanings.  In this Article, I theorize and assess 
these shifts, situating and analyzing them within a broader, longer term set 
of developments concerning technology and surveillance in contemporary 
governance.16  Immigration control has not simply evolved into a system to 
effectuate the removal of noncitizens on a massive scale, although it 
manifestly has done that.  More fundamentally, the evolution of this system 
has reshaped the meanings and functions of immigration governance itself, 
                                                          
 13.  See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 613 (2012); Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Prob-
lem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595 (2009); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: 
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007); Tere-
sa A. Miller, Citizenship and Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2003); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deporta-
tion Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000); Juliet P. 
Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 
367 (2006). 
 14.  E.g., Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law 
After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
295 (2002); Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and “Aliens”: Privacy Expectations and the Immigration 
Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081 (2008); Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocument-
ed Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543 (2011); Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Citi-
zenship Talk: Bridging the Gap Between Immigration and Race Perspectives, 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2493 (2007); Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S. Immigration 
Law and Enforcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2009); Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect Vic-
tims and Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L. REV. 
157 (2007); SHARITA GRUBERG, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, DIGNITY DENIED: LGBT 
IMMIGRANTS IN U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION (2013). 
 15.  E.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 577 (2012); Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 703 (2013); Lucas Guttentag, Discrimination, Preemption, and Arizona’s Immigration 
Law: A Broader View, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2012); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional 
Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2008); Anil Kalhan, Immigration 
Enforcement and Federalism After September 11, 2001, in IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION, AND 
SECURITY: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia 
& Simon Reich eds., 2008); Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigra-
tion Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819 
(2011); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 57 (2007). 
 16.  See GILLIOM & MONAHAN, supra note 4; Balkin, supra note 4; Marx, supra note 4; see 
also Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 101, 106 (2008) (discussing implications 
of the emergence of “nonphysical, technology-based means of control,” such as location tracking, 
biometric scanning, and electronic indexing, in criminal justice processes). 
  
8 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:1 
transforming a regime of immigration control, operating primarily upon 
noncitizens at the border, into part of a more expansive regime of migration 
and mobility surveillance, operating without geographic bounds upon 
citizens and noncitizens alike.17  Traditional immigration law frameworks 
offer neither the vocabulary to fully engage with this transformation nor the 
mechanisms to constrain these surveillance activities across the many 
domains in which they occur.  Accordingly, I advance a framework to 
understand and respond to these developments rooted in scholarship on 
surveillance and privacy, bridging a larger divide identified by Vicki Squire 
between scholarship on the law and politics of “control” and scholarship on 
the law and politics of “migration or movement.”18 
After recounting and interpreting the immigration enforcement 
system’s rapid expansion and reconfiguration in Part I, I demonstrate in 
Part II how new technologies have reconfigured approaches to four distinct 
sets of immigration surveillance practices: identification, screening and 
authorization, mobility tracking and control, and information sharing.  
These systems and processes routinize the collection, storage, aggregation, 
processing, and dissemination of detailed personal information for 
immigration control and other purposes on an unprecedented scale and 
facilitate the involvement of an escalating number of federal, state, local, 
private, and non-U.S. actors in immigration control activities.  In Part III, I 
explain why the legalization provisions in comprehensive immigration 
reform proposals would only make this emergent surveillance regime more 
durable and pervasive, since the logic of surveillance—and of making 
unauthorized migrants legible and visible to the state—is embedded within 
those legalization proposals themselves.  This consistency between the 
rationales for legalization and immigration surveillance also can be seen in 
the Obama Administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(“DACA”) program, which illustrates on a smaller scale what immigration 
surveillance could look like in the context of any large scale legalization 
program that Congress might choose to adopt. 
In the remainder of the Article, I consider the implications of this 
reordering.  In Part IV, I situate immigration surveillance within broader 
developments concerning technology, surveillance, and privacy, analyzing 
                                                          
 17.  Cf. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 168 (2001) (explaining the process by which the “institutional archi-
tecture” and “state apparatus” of criminal justice have remained “firmly in place,” but have been 
transformed in their “deployment, strategic functioning, and social significance”); SASKIA 
SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES 1, 403 
(2006) (discussing “micro-processes” of globalization that “begin to denationalize what had been 
constructed as national”). 
 18.  Vicki Squire, The Contested Politics of Mobility in THE CONTESTED POLITICS OF 
MOBILITY: BORDERZONES AND IRREGULARITY 1, 3–4 (Vicki Squire ed. 2011); see Murphy, su-
pra note 16 (bridging the analogous divide between scholarship on criminal incapacitation and 
scholarship on privacy and surveillance). 
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the consequences of routinized and widening collection, processing, 
retention, and dissemination of detailed personal information for 
immigration control purposes.  As these immigration surveillance activities 
have proliferated, what I term the migration border—the set of boundary 
points at which nation-states authorize individuals to enter or be admitted, 
prevent or allow their entry or admission, or subject them to possible 
expulsion—has been decoupled from the territorial border and rendered 
“virtual”: layered, electronic, mobile, and policed by an escalating number 
of public and private actors.  In the process, the lines between immigration 
control and other regulatory domains have blurred. 
The technologies that enable immigration surveillance are not 
inherently harmful; indeed, many of them can and do bring significant 
benefits.  However, their unconstrained implementation also carries several 
categories of underappreciated costs—all of which are exacerbated by the 
extent of deference afforded in the context of immigration enforcement, 
border control, and national security.  Accordingly, in Part V, I identify and 
advance principles to constrain, inform, and guide the implementation of 
these tools of the “automated administrative state.”19  As illustrated in 
current debates over surveillance and data mining by the National Security 
Agency and other institutions, both public and private, the unimpeded 
expansion of surveillance and dataveillance mechanisms erodes both the 
legal principles and the practical mechanisms that have traditionally 
constrained aggregations of public and private power and protected 
individual autonomy and privacy.20  In the immigration context, those 
constraints have always been less robust than in many other regulatory 
domains. Drawing upon surveillance and privacy scholarship, I urge more 
constrained implementation of these powerful technologies, with greater 
transparency and oversight, to preserve zones where immigration 
surveillance activities do not take place and to ensure greater due process 
and accountability when they do. 
A complete understanding of immigration regulation today must 
account for how the evolution of enforcement institutions, practices, and 
meanings has not simply increased the number of noncitizens being 
deported, but has effected a more basic transformation in immigration 
governance, in a manner that experiences outside the immigration context 
similarly illustrate.21  Nor is the onset of the immigration surveillance state 
                                                          
 19.  Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1258 
(2008); see also Kalhan, supra note 9. 
 20.  GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S. 
SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING 
(AND WHY WE SHOULD WORRY) (2011); Alice E. Marwick, How Your Data Are Being Deeply 
Mined, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 9, 2014, at 22. 
 21.  GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 208 (1988) (“Com-
puters qualitatively alter the nature of surveillance—routinizing, broadening, and deepening it”); 
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solely of concern to immigration specialists, especially since experience 
shows that innovations in surveillance techniques and technologies often 
are initiated with groups that are vulnerable or subject to heightened 
control—including noncitizens—before later going mainstream.22  As the 
institutions of immigration surveillance rapidly become integrated into the 
broader national surveillance state, the need to squarely address the 
consequences of that reconfiguration becomes more acute.23 
I.  THE TRANSFORMATION OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
Before assessing the shifts currently taking place in the nature of 
immigration governance with the implementation of new technologies, it is 
necessary to first understand the development and proliferation of the 
immigration enforcement activities into which these new systems are being 
deployed.  While regularized enforcement programs were limited for much 
of U.S. history and have tended to emphasize control of the territorial 
border with Mexico, in recent decades immigration monitoring and control 
initiatives have grown explosively across a much broader range of 
domains.24  In this Part, to establish the context for the technology-enabled 
                                                          
Bernard E. Harcourt, After the “Social Meaning Turn”: Implications for Research Design and 
Methods of Proof in Contemporary Criminal Law Policy Analysis, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 179, 
182 (2000) (arguing that curfew laws and order maintenance policing not only “influence . . . 
short-term behavior” as intended but also “reconfigure” and “more deeply affect our very under-
standing of order or disorder” and “shape us as contemporary subjects of society”); MARIANO-
FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR, GOVERNING SECURITY: THE HIDDEN ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SECURITY 
AGENCIES xi–xii (2013) (arguing that interplay between “architecture of public agencies . . . polit-
ical strategies, and legal interpretations” has “shaped public perceptions of [national] security” and 
“given life” to its meaning); GARLAND, supra note 17, at 194 (arguing that crime control strate-
gies have not simply been responses to “political and cultural values” of “the late modern world,” 
but have “play[ed] a role in creating that world, helping to constitute the meaning of late moderni-
ty”); DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM (2010) 
(arguing that emphasis on accountability and testing in education reform has reshaped the nature 
and meaning of education itself). 
 22.  SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL 
IDENTIFICATION 119–20 (2001) (explaining that late 19th century innovations in fingerprint iden-
tification were “stimulated by a perceived need to identify ‘faceless,’ racially unfamiliar” recent 
immigrants); GILLIOM & MONAHAN, supra note 4, at 73 (describing schools, prisons, and military 
institutions as “laboratories for new surveillance practices” in which “innovations in surveillance 
technology are first deployed”); Virginia Eubanks, Want to Predict the Future of Surveillance? 
Ask Poor Communities, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 15, 2014), http://prospect.org/article/want-predict-
future-surveillance-ask-poor-communities; see David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 
959 (2002) (“[W]hat we are willing to allow our government to do to immigrants creates prece-
dents for how it treats citizens.”). 
 23.  Balkin, supra note 4; Gus Hosein, Defining the Surveillance State, PRIVACY INT’L (Oct. 
31, 2013), http://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/defining-the-surveillance-state; see also 
GILLIOM & MONAHAN, supra note 4, at 45 (describing the process by which “all significant insti-
tutions are implementing similar models of governance” that “use[] identification, visibility, and 
surveillance as [their] central strategies”). 
 24.  PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE 88 (2000); BILL 
ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 115 (2004); DANIEL 
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shifts that I examine in this Article, I recount this transformation, which 
spans every stage of the migration process: before individuals travel to the 
United States, during their travel and when they seek to enter, while they 
are present, and when they depart.  I identify and discuss major shifts in the 
modalities and priorities of enforcement across five categories: (1) 
initiatives that monitor and regulate entry into the United States, (2) post-
entry initiatives that directly monitor and regulate noncitizens, (3) post-
entry initiatives that indirectly monitor and regulate noncitizens, (4) 
criminal prosecutions, and (5) initiatives that monitor and regulate 
departures from the United States. 
Importantly, while these programs have been initiated and 
implemented as immigration control measures, many of these measures 
necessarily operate upon and are experienced by both noncitizens and U.S. 
citizens alike.25  Increasingly, many of these initiatives also are being 
deployed to serve a range of other, non-immigration-related purposes.  For 
example, especially in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks and the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), immigration 
enforcement activities have increasingly been cast with security-related 
significance.26 In 2003, the immigration-related functions formerly 
performed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), within 
the Department of Justice, were transferred to three new agencies with 
DHS: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (“USCIS”), and U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”)—all of which are charged to approach immigration 
governance first and foremost through the lens of security.27  Paradoxically, 
even as it has significantly intensified immigration enforcement activities, 
the United States has continued to encourage expanded migration flows 
while simultaneously seeking to control the nature and patterns of those 
flows.  As a result, the expansion of immigration enforcement measures 
discussed in this Part has operated not only to facilitate the expulsion of 
potentially removable noncitizens, as discussions of immigration 
enforcement usually emphasize, but also to enable additional forms of 
                                                          
KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 2, 6 (2007) (character-
izing the deportation system as having grown “slowly, incrementally, and reactively” from “de-
centralized” and “inefficient” beginnings); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, JORGE DURAND & NOLAN J. 
MALONE, BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION 26 (2003) (describing early border control efforts as “more symbolic than real”); 
MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS & THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 
(2004); Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993). 
 25.  Kalhan, supra note 1, at 1149.  
 26.  CUÉLLAR, supra note 21, at 125–89.   
 27.  See MICHELLE MITTELSTADT, BURKE SPEAKER, DORIS MEISSNER & MUZAFFAR 
CHISHTI, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., THROUGH THE PRISM OF NATIONAL SECURITY: MAJOR 
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND PROGRAM CHANGES IN THE DECADE SINCE 9/11 (2011). 
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regulation, control, and exclusion that are experienced by both noncitizens 
and citizens.28 
A.  Monitoring and Regulating Entry 
Historically, territorial borders and their functional equivalents have 
been the focal points of immigration control, and as immigration 
enforcement activities have expanded in recent decades, the federal 
government has continued to invest heavily in border control and other 
measures to control entry into the United States.  Among these measures, 
the most visible initiative involves the quasi-militarized fortification of the 
U.S.-Mexico land border.29  CBP’s Border Patrol, which totaled a few 
thousand agents in the early 1990s, has doubled since 2004 to over 21,000 
agents, with the vast majority posted along the southwestern border.30  In 
addition, congressional mandates have prompted the construction of over 
650 miles of fencing and other physical barriers.31  Current immigration 
reform proposals would go dramatically further, doubling both the number 
of Border Patrol agents and the extent of fencing and physical barriers.32 
                                                          
 28.  See PHILIP KRETSEDEMAS, MIGRANTS AND RACE IN THE US: TERRITORIAL RACISM AND 
THE ALIEN OUTSIDE 39, 122 (2013) (observing that the “practical effect” of expanded immigra-
tion enforcement “has been to control an expanding migrant flow and not to reduce the number of 
migrants entering the nation”); Philip Kretsedemas, The Limits of Control: Neo-Liberal Policy 
Priorities and the U.S. Non-Immigrant Flow, 50 INT’L MIGRATION e1, e1 (2012) (analyzing the 
relationship between the “apparently divergent trends” of “liberalization of migrant flows,” on the 
one hand, and “the intensification of immigration enforcement,” on the other); see also KUNAL M. 
PARKER, IMMIGRANTS AND OTHER FOREIGNERS IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP LAW (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 4) (explaining and documenting the ways in 
which U.S. immigration and citizenship law historically has encompassed “efforts to render [indi-
viduals] foreign that have applied to insiders and outsiders, neighbors and strangers,” including 
U.S. citizens and noncitizens alike). 
 29.  ANDREAS, supra note 24, at 85–112; MASSEY ET AL., supra note 24, at 96–98. 
 30.  MARC R. ROSENBLUM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BORDER SECURITY: IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY 14–15 (2013).  The Obama Administration also has 
deployed approximately 1,200 National Guard personnel to support the Border Patrol along the 
southwestern border.  MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 25–26. 
 31.  Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 § 564, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 2090, 
2090–91 (2007); Secure Fence Act of 2006 § 3, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638, 2638–39 
(2006); REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 302, 302–23 (2005); Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 102(a)–(c), Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 554, 554–55 (1996); see MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 30–31; Denise Gilman, 
Seeking Breaches in the Wall: An International Human Rights Law Challenge to the Texas-
Mexico Border Wall, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 257, 258 (2011); Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Why a Wall?, 
2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 147, 151 (2012). 
 32.  Border Security, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744, 
113th Cong. §§ 1101–1123 (as passed by Senate, June 27, 2013); see also Fact Sheet, Emergency 
Supplemental Request to Address the Increase in Child and Adult Migration from Central Ameri-
ca in the Rio Grande Valley Areas of the Southwest Border, WHITE HOUSE (July 8, 2014), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/07/08/fact-sheet-emergency-supplemental-
request-address-increase-child-and-adu.  
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Regulation of the U.S.-Canada border, by contrast, has historically 
been more limited, but since 2001, security-driven anxieties have effected a 
shift toward what Peter Andreas describes as the “Mexicanization” of the 
northern border.33  The number of Border Patrol agents posted along the 
U.S.-Canada border has increased from a few hundred in the 1990s to over 
2,200 today.34  Since 2001, the United States, Canada, and Mexico have 
coordinated other enforcement practices.  Border enforcement teams and 
security task forces have been established with both Canada and Mexico to 
coordinate investigations and other activities, and plans exist to expand this 
cooperation.35  The United States and Canada also have entered into a “safe 
third country” agreement that largely bars refugee claimants arriving in one 
country from seeking protection in the other.36 
However, officials have gone well beyond these North America-
specific initiatives, taking aggressive steps to regulate and monitor lawful 
entry into the United States more generally.  These initiatives build on 
mechanisms that have long existed.  For noncitizens, Congress has long 
required immigrant or nonimmigrant visas, with limited exceptions, before 
entering the United States and has established grounds of inadmissibility or 
excludability to screen out noncitizens deemed to raise public safety, public 
health, national security, and other social concerns.37  While U.S. citizens 
are generally assumed to have a right to enter the United States—and at 
times have been subject to very minimal scrutiny when entering—U.S. 
officials have nevertheless historically exercised control over international 
travel by U.S. citizens, including their entry in the United States, through 
                                                          
 33.  Peter Andreas, The Mexicanization of the US-Canada Border: Asymmetric Interdepend-
ence in a Changing Security Context, 60 INT’L J. 449 (2005); Audrey Macklin, Disappearing Ref-
ugees: Reflections on the Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 365, 411 (2005). 
 34.  MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 18, 38–39; Nina Bernstein, Border Sweeps in North 
Reach Miles into U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2010, at A1. 
 35.  Canada-U.S. Smart Border Declaration: Building a Smart Border for the 21st Century on 
the Foundation of a North American Zone of Confidence, Dec. 12, 2001; U.S.-Canada Beyond the 
Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness, Dec. 2011; see 
CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE & KRISTIN M. FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S.-MEXICAN 
SECURITY COOPERATION: THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE AND BEYOND (2013); Sigrid Arzt, U.S.-
Mexico Security Collaboration: Intelligence Sharing and Law Enforcement Cooperation, in 
SHARED RESPONSIBILITY: U.S.-MEXICO POLICY OPTIONS FOR CONFRONTING ORGANIZED CRIME 
351 (Eric L. Olson, David A. Shirk & Andrew D. Selee eds., 2010); Kent Roach, Uneasy Neigh-
bors: Comparative American and Canadian Counter-Terrorism, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1701, 1790–94 (2012). 
 36.  Safe Third Country Agreement, Can.-U.S., Dec. 5, 2002; Efrat Arbel, Shifting Borders 
and the Boundaries of Rights: Examining the Safe Third Country Agreement Between Canada and 
the United States, 25 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 65 (2013). 
 37.  IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 41–98 (13th ed. 2012).  Under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, a “nonimmigrant” is a noncitizen who falls within one of a vari-
ety of statutorily defined categories of non-permanent entrants to the United States.  The statute 
defines all other noncitizens as “immigrants.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2013). 
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the issuance, recognition, and revocation of U.S. passports and by other 
regulatory means.38  Procedurally, when seeking to enter the United States, 
both noncitizens and U.S. citizens have traditionally been subject at the 
border to questioning and “routine” suspicionless searches and seizures, 
which the Supreme Court has deemed to be per se reasonable when 
conducted for purposes of enforcing immigration and customs laws—and 
therefore exempt from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable cause 
requirements—“simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.”39 
In recent years, however, efforts to control entry have extended well 
beyond traditional means of excluding noncitizens, regulating U.S. citizen 
travel, and conducting ordinary searches and seizures at the border, as both 
noncitizens and U.S. citizens have been subject to more intensive scrutiny 
at every stage of the process of migrating or traveling to the United States.  
Most of these new initiatives have roots in immigration policy debates that 
predate the 2001 terrorist attacks.  For example, in the 1980s and 1990s, 
Congress steadily expanded the grounds upon which noncitizens may be 
barred from entry or admission and curtailed the opportunities for those 
grounds to be waived.40  But as with the Canada-specific initiatives 
discussed above, efforts to tighten control over entry since 2001 
increasingly have been justified with reference to national security and 
criminal law enforcement, and have emphasized the collection, storage, 
processing, and sharing of detailed personal information about all 
prospective entrants.41 
First, before even seeking to enter the United States, noncitizens are 
scrutinized more closely than ever before when applying for visas.  
Although the State Department plays the primary role in processing visa 
applications, Congress has authorized DHS to assign its own personnel to 
diplomatic posts to advise and train consular officers, conduct 
investigations, and review consular decisions.  Congress has mandated in-
                                                          
 38.  Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 67 (2001) (describing U.S. 
citizenship as conferring an “absolute right to enter its borders”); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
TRANSPORTATION: EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RECEPTION OF FOREIGN VISITORS AT U.S. AIRPORTS 
5–6 (1991); Jeffrey Kahn, The Extraordinary Mrs. Shipley: How the United States Controlled In-
ternational Travel Before the Age of Terrorism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 819 (2011). 
 39.  United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977); see Kalhan, supra note 1, at 1189–
97; Immigration Inspections When Arriving in the U.S., TRAC IMMIGRATION (Apr. 4, 2006), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/142.  While “non-routine” searches or seizures at the bor-
der must be justified by reasonable suspicion, courts have established a high threshold to deem 
searches or seizures non-routine, and the Supreme Court has applied a lower standard for non-
routine border searches and seizures than the probable cause standard that ordinarily applies inside 
the country.  United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 551 (1985). 
 40.  See Nancy Morawetz, The Invisible Border: Restrictions on Short-Term Travel by 
Noncitizens, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 201 (2007) [hereinafter Morawetz, Invisible Border]; Nancy 
Morawetz, Rethinking Drug Inadmissibility, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163 (2008). 
 41.  See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT 416–19 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMM’N REPORT]. 
 1/14/2015  12:10 PM 
2014] IMMIGRATION SURVEILLANCE 15 
person interviews for most nonimmigrant visa applicants, who are also 
subject to more intensive background checks.42  Moreover, while 
noncitizens from countries designated under the Visa Waiver Program have 
been permitted since 1986 to enter the United States without visas as short-
term visitors, Congress and DHS more recently have mandated these 
individuals to apply online for advance “authorization” to enter before 
commencing their travel.43  Noncitizens admitted to the United States as 
refugees are also now subject to detailed and lengthy background checks.44 
Second, both noncitizens and U.S. citizens face increased scrutiny 
during their travel to the United States.  International carriers have long 
been required to ensure that their passengers are legally authorized to enter 
the United States and may be held liable for failure to do so.45  Beginning in 
1988, at the request of U.S. officials, many carriers voluntarily began to 
transmit personal information collected prior to departure from passengers 
and other sources to U.S. officials while en route to the United States in 
order to facilitate efficient customs and immigration screening upon 
arrival.46  In the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress and DHS 
mandated all commercial airlines and sea carriers to transmit this 
information to U.S. officials prior to departure, both to facilitate customs 
and immigration screening and to assess potential risks posed by both 
noncitizen and U.S. citizen travelers.47  In addition, although formal 
inspection and admission of travelers ordinarily takes place upon arrival at 
official U.S. ports of entry, individuals traveling from some countries are 
                                                          
 42.  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 
Stat. 3638 (2004); Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 428, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 287 (2002); 
KEVIN R. JOHNSON, RAQUEL E. ALDANA, BILL ONG HING, LETICIA SAUCEDO, & ENID TRUCIOS-
HAYNES, UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRATION LAW 287–95 (2009). 
 43.  8 U.S.C. § 1187 (2013); Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007 § 711, Pub. L. 110-53, 121 Stat. 338 (2007); Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Re-
form Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002); A. James Vazquez-Azpiri & Daniel C. 
Horne, The Doorkeeper of Homeland Security: Proposals for the Visa Waiver Program, 16 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 513, 524–28 (2005). 
 44.  U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, THE EFFECTS OF NEW UNITED STATES SECURITY 
SCREENING MEASURES FOR REFUGEES (2012). 
 45.  Janet A. Gilboy, Implications of “Third-Party” Involvement in Enforcement: The INS, 
Illegal Travelers, and International Airlines, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 505 (1997). 
 46.  EDWARD ALDEN, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN BORDER: TERRORISM, 
IMMIGRATION, AND SECURITY SINCE 9/11, at 28–32 (2009); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
supra note 38, at 5–6. 
 47.  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 § 4012, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 
118 Stat. 3714 (2004); Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act § 402, Pub. L. No. 
107-153, 116 Stat. 543 (2002); Aviation and Transportation Security Act § 115(c), Pub. L. No. 
107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001); see infra Part II.B.3.  Noncitizen travelers are inadmissible if they 
decline to provide this advance passenger information to carriers, and U.S. citizens who decline to 
provide this information may be prohibited from traveling by the carrier or subjected to greater 
scrutiny upon arrival in the United States.  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, 
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE ADVANCE PASSENGER INFORMATION SYSTEM (APIS) 
(2007). 
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subject to “preinspection” before they commence their travel by U.S. 
officials posted extraterritorially at ports of embarkation.48  Since 2004, 
DHS also has posted “advisory personnel” in several countries to help 
airline employees and airport officials review travel documents and screen 
travelers for security and public safety risks on U.S.-bound flights, and in 
some instances to make recommendations that airlines not board particular 
travelers.49 
Finally, both citizens and noncitizens are now scrutinized more closely 
when they arrive and seek to enter the United States.  Over 400 million 
noncitizens and U.S. citizens lawfully enter the United States at official 
ports of entry each year—with approximately one-quarter of them arriving 
by air—and border inspectors now conduct more intensive scrutiny to 
determine their admissibility and any risks they might present.50  Congress 
has conferred inspectors with wide latitude to use a streamlined mechanism, 
expedited removal, to turn away noncitizens deemed inadmissible on 
specified grounds upon their arrival without further adjudication.51  U.S. 
officials also have been more assertive in restricting international travel by 
U.S. citizens, including their entry into the United States—for example, by 
confiscating or revoking their passports while abroad, prohibiting travel by 
air or sea, or creating other obstacles to entry.52  In addition, both 
                                                          
 48.  8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (2013); U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, FACT SHEET: 
PRECLEARANCE OPERATIONS 1 (May 2013), 
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/preclearance_factsheet_2.pdf; Harry Hiller, Air-
ports as Borderlands: American Preclearance and Transitional Spaces in Canada, 25 J. 
BORDERLANDS STUD. 19, 21–27 (2010). 
 49.  While these U.S. officials lack authority to prohibit individuals from traveling to the 
United States, airlines generally comply with their no-board recommendations, given the risk of 
being denied landing and the potential sanctions they might face if individuals are refused admis-
sion upon arrival.  U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, FACT SHEET: IMMIGRATION 
ADVISORY PROGRAM (IAP) (May 2013), 
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/immig_advis_prog_2.pdf; see also LISA 
SEGHETTI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BORDER SECURITY: IMMIGRATION INSPECTIONS AT PORT 
OF ENTRY 10 (2014). 
 50.  MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 57–58. 
 51.  8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I); see Lisa J. LaPlante, Expedited Removal at U.S. Bor-
ders: A World Without a Constitution, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 213 (1999); Jaya Ram-
ji, Legislating Away International Law: The Refugee Provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 117 (2001). 
 52.  Jeffrey Kahn, International Travel and the Constitution, 56 UCLA L. REV. 271 (2008); 
Leti Volpp, Citizenship Undone, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2579 (2007); Amel Ahmed, Yemeni-
Americans Cry Foul over Passport Revocations, AL JAZEERA AM. (Jan. 21, 2014), 
http://alj.am/1dN18A5; Nick Baumann, Can the Government Confiscate a Citizen’s Passport for 
No Apparent Reason? It Just Did, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 14, 2014), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/04/us-passport-confiscated-embassy-nader-el-dajani; 
Cyrus Farivar, Snowden Speaks: By Revoking Passport, US Gov’t Is “Using Citizenship as a 
Weapon,” ARS TECHNICA (Jul. 1, 2013), http://ars.to/11bF3G2; Glenn Greenwald, US Muslim 
Placed on No-Fly List Is Unable to See His Ailing Mother, GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2012), 
http://gu.com/p/3btaf/tw; Identity Project, Does a U.S. Citizen Need the Government’s Permission 
to Return to the U.S.?, PAPERS, PLEASE (Jan. 28, 2014), 
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noncitizens and U.S. citizens increasingly have been subject to more 
intrusive questioning or searches and seizures at the border—for example, 
the seizure, imaging, and search of computer hard drives and other 
electronic storage media—with little if any judicial oversight.53 
While individuals previously could travel between the United States 
and Mexico, Canada, and the Caribbean without passports, all U.S. citizens 
and noncitizens are now required to possess a passport or other approved 
travel document to enter the United States under most circumstances.54  
DHS also now exercises greater scrutiny over the rapidly growing number 
of individuals enrolled in its registered traveler programs.  These programs 
provide expedited immigration and customs processing and more limited 
airport security screening to approved U.S. citizen and noncitizen travelers 
who submit detailed personal information and, following government 
background checks, are deemed to present low risks.55 
B.  Direct Post-Entry Monitoring and Enforcement 
Among the policy shifts most widely analyzed by immigration law 
scholars has been the growth of direct, post-entry enforcement within the 
United States.  Historically, once noncitizens had entered the country, 
                                                          
http://papersplease.org/wp/2014/01/28/does-a-us-citizen-need-the-governments-permission-to-
return-to-the-us/; SEGHETTI, supra note 48, at 10.  The legality of these practices has been sharply 
questioned.  See ASIAN AMERICANS ADVANCING JUSTICE ET AL., STRANDED ABROAD: SHADOW 
REPORT ON COERCIVE INTERROGATIONS AND DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS IN THE CONFISCATION 
OR REVOCATION OF PASSPORTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS OF YEMENI ORIGIN (2014); Ramzi 
Kassem, Passport Revocation As Proxy Denaturalization: Examining the Yemen Cases, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2099 (2014); Patrick Weil, Citizenship, Passports, and the Legal Identity of 
Americans: Edward Snowden and Others Have a Case in the Courts, 123 YALE L.J. F. 565 
(2014).  For legal challenges, see, for example, Hizam v. Clinton, No. 11 Civ. 7693, 2012 WL 
3116026, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2012), rev’d sub nom. Hizam v. Kerry, 747 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 
2014); Complaint, Nagi v. Kerry, No. 14 Civ. 13948 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 14, 2014), ECF No. 1, 
available at http://klhn.co/Nagi-EDMich-ECF-1; Kassem, supra, at 2107 n.56. 
 53.  RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT THE GOVERNMENT 
DOES WITH AMERICANS’ DATA 34–38 (2013); Benjamin J. Rankin, Restoring Privacy at the Bor-
der: Extending the Reasonable Suspicion Standard for Laptop Border Searches, 43 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 301 (2011); Ahmed Shihab-Eldin, Davos to Detention: Why I Hate Coming Home to 
America, HUFF. POST (Jan. 28, 2014), http://huff.to/1aFH5Dq; Zack Whittaker, Welcome to the 
United States: Discriminated, Detained, Searched, Interrogated, ZDNET (Aug. 31, 2013), 
http://zd.net/14gUXez; compare United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (en 
banc) (requiring reasonable suspicion, upon an individual’s arrival at the border, to copy and con-
duct a forensic examination of the individual’s computer hard drive, but finding that reasonable 
suspicion was satisfied); with Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (sug-
gesting, in dicta, that suspicionless searches of electronic devices at the border might be permissi-
ble). 
 54.  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 § 7209(b), Pub. L. No. 108-
458, 118 Stat. 3823 (2004); U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, WHTI [WESTERN 
HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE] PROGRAM BACKGROUND (2013), http://www.getyouhome.gov. 
 55.  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 § 7208(k); Enhanced Border 
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 § 302(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 553 
(2002). 
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immigration officials made little sustained effort to oversee their presence 
or investigate grounds for their potential deportation.  Even when Congress 
first began to enact post-entry deportability grounds, their scope remained 
limited.  Deportability grounds typically carried statutes of limitations, and 
opportunities for discretionary relief from deportation were made widely 
available based on an individualized assessment of factors, including 
rehabilitation, the effect of deportation on family members, community 
involvement, and ties to country of origin.56 
In recent decades, however, the regulation of immigration after 
noncitizens have entered the United States has increased dramatically.  In 
part, post-entry enforcement serves as an extension of regulation of the 
territorial border, intended to apprehend noncitizens who are unlawfully 
present.  Under what Daniel Kanstroom terms an “extended border control” 
model of enforcement, officials seek to deport not only unlawful entrants 
but also the many individuals—estimated in recent years to comprise 
between forty and fifty percent of all unauthorized migrants—who lawfully 
enter as temporary nonimmigrants and then overstay or otherwise violate 
their terms of admission.57  But Congress also has fashioned a second 
model of deportation by expanding the bases upon which individuals who 
are lawfully present may be “delegalized” and deported for post-entry 
conduct.58  The trend toward this model of what Kanstroom calls “post-
entry social control” has been particularly severe for individuals with post-
entry criminal convictions.59  Until the 1980s, only a limited number of 
serious crimes rendered noncitizens deportable, and in most instances, those 
                                                          
 56.  Morawetz, supra note 13, at 1938–39; Mae M. Ngai, We Need a Deportation Deadline, 
WASH. POST (Jun. 14, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/06/13/AR2005061301460.html. 
 57.  KANSTROOM, supra note 12, at 31–42; see PEW HISPANIC CTR., MODES OF ENTRY FOR 
THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION (2006); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-11-411, OVERSTAY ENFORCEMENT: ADDITIONAL MECHANISMS FOR COLLECTING, 
ASSESSING, AND SHARING DATA COULD STRENGTHEN DHS’S EFFORTS BUT WOULD HAVE 
COSTS (2011).  But see BRYAN ROBERTS, EDWARD ALDEN & JOHN WHITLEY, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, MANAGING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: HOW 
EFFECTIVE IS ENFORCEMENT? 32–33 (2013) (suggesting that the number of new visa overstays 
“has dropped sharply in the past decade” and prevailing estimates of overstay population “may be 
inflated”).  In addition, although no reliable estimates exist concerning their numbers, some indi-
viduals also may be deemed unlawfully present because they entered the United States using false 
identity documents or genuine documents that were improperly obtained.  See KAMAL SADIQ, 
PAPER CITIZENS: HOW ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS ACQUIRE CITIZENSHIP IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(2009); RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IMMIGRATION FRAUD: POLICIES, 
INVESTIGATIONS, AND ISSUES 1–2 (2008). 
 58.  Aarti Shahani, Legalization and De-Legalization, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Apr. 2006), 
http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/civil-rights/3205-legalization-and-de-legalization; see 
KANSTROOM, supra note 12, at 31–42 (discussing growth in “post-entry social control” as model 
of enforcement); Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration 
Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 835-40 (2007) (describing shift in immigration enforcement from “ex 
ante” screening in the form of exclusion to “ex post” screening in the form of deportation). 
 59.  KANSTROOM, supra note 12, at 31–42. 
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individuals could seek discretionary relief from deportation.  Since 1988, 
however, Congress has steadily (and at times retroactively) expanded the 
list of criminal deportability grounds to include a broad range of 
comparatively minor crimes, including a variety of misdemeanors and 
nonviolent felonies, and has sharply narrowed eligibility for discretionary 
relief.60 
The consequences have been transformative, as federal officials now 
place unprecedented emphasis on direct post-entry enforcement within the 
United States.  Over half of all individuals removed in recent years have 
been deported from inside the United States.61  Since 1999, deportation of 
individuals with criminal convictions has been the government’s highest 
stated interior enforcement priority, and the number of individuals removed 
on criminal grounds has increased accordingly.62  Of the 391,000 
individuals removed in 2011, almost half had a prior conviction, compared 
to three percent in 1986.63  Moreover, as the U.S. economy has slumped 
since 2008 and the number of unauthorized migrants has dropped—and as 
southwestern border enforcement strategies have increasingly emphasized 
criminal prosecution rather than immediate expulsion—the number of 
informal, “voluntary” returns without formal removal orders, which 
typically occur at or near the territorial border, has plummeted.64  As a 
result of these shifts, lawfully present noncitizens have become immigration 
enforcement targets to a greater extent than ever before, and the number of 
formal removals arising from interior enforcement activities now 
significantly dwarfs the number of informal returns arising from 
apprehensions at or near the territorial border.65 
                                                          
 60.  Morawetz, supra note 13, at 1938–43; Stumpf, supra note 13, at 382–84; see Nancy 
Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 97 (1998); Kalhan, supra note 1, at 1155–56. 
 61.  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STATS., supra note 8, at 6. 
 62.  MARC R. ROSENBLUM & WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INTERIOR 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS 12–13 (2012); DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SEC., ENDGAME: DETENTION AND REMOVAL STRATEGIC PLAN, 2003–2012, at 3–
4 (2003). 
 63.  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STATS., supra note 8, at 112. 
 64.  Richard Marosi, New Border Foe: Boredom—U.S. Agents Fight to Stay Awake as Illegal 
Crossings Plummet, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2011, at 1; Goodman, supra note 8; see ROSENBLUM ET 
AL., supra note 8, at 23 (“[T]oday’s deportation system has been transformed from one that relied 
overwhelmingly on informal returns to one that mainly emphasizes formal removal.”). 
 65.  One study of government records estimates that at least twenty percent of noncitizens 
removed because of criminal convictions were lawfully present when charged as deportable and 
then delegalized in the removal process. In addition, the study noted that in a data set consisting of 
almost 900,000 individuals deported on criminal grounds, the government could not identify the 
immigration status of approximately 65,000 noncitizens—fully seven percent of the total. HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, FORCED APART (BY THE NUMBERS): NON-CITIZENS DEPORTED MOSTLY FOR 
NONVIOLENT OFFENSES 23–26 (2009).  
  
20 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:1 
This expansion of direct post-entry enforcement consists of several 
component mechanisms.  First, noncitizens have been subject to more 
extensive, ongoing monitoring and registration requirements while in the 
United States.  While noncitizens have long been required, as a formal 
matter, to register and be fingerprinted upon arrival, to carry proof of 
registration at all times within the United States, and to notify immigration 
officials promptly of changes of address, these provisions went largely 
unenforced for decades.66  Even today, these registration requirements 
largely remain a legal fiction.67  Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the 2001 
terrorist attacks, the government did step up both its formal and informal 
efforts to monitor certain categories of noncitizens within the United 
States.68  For example, beginning soon after the attacks, the FBI initiated a 
program of “voluntary” interviews for thousands of Arab and Muslim men 
with nonimmigrant visas.69  In early 2002, the Justice Department 
announced plans to aggressively enforce the change of address provision, 
warning of severe adverse consequences for noncompliance.70  Later in 
2002, the Attorney General initiated the National Security Entry-Exit 
Registration System (“NSEERS”), which imposed registration requirements 
on nonimmigrant men who were at least sixteen years old and current or 
former nationals of twenty-five countries, all but one predominantly Arab 
or Muslim.71  Congress and DHS also tightened oversight of international 
                                                          
 66.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1306 (2013); see Etuk v. Slattery, 936 F.2d 1433, 1436–37 (2d Cir. 
1991) (discussing registration requirements for permanent residents); Rashad Hussain, Preventing 
the New Internment: A Security-Sensitive Standard for Equal Protection Claims in the Post-9/11 
Era, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 117, 126–27 (2007) (discussing underenforcement of registration pro-
visions); Nancy Morawetz & Natasha J. Silber, Immigration Law and the Myth of Comprehensive 
Registration, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 6, 48), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2469403 (describing the widespread assumption that a comprehensive 
federal alien registration system exists in practice as a “dangerous myth” and “insidious miscon-
ception”).  
 67.  See Morawetz & Silber, supra note 66 (manuscript at 27) (“Most noncitizens in the Unit-
ed States are exempt from registration and carry requirements pursuant to statute, regulation, ad-
ministrative design, and systemic inefficiencies.”). 
 68.  See Rey Koslowski, Smart Borders, Virtual Borders or No Borders: Homeland Security 
Choices for the United States and Canada, 11 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 527, 533–34 (2005); Victor 
C. Romero, Noncitizen Students and Immigration Policy Post-9/11, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 357 
(2002). 
 69.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOMELAND SECURITY: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S 
PROJECT TO INTERVIEW ALIENS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 (2003); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL: LIBERTY AND SECURITY FOR THE POST-
SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES 40–41 (2003). 
 70.  MUZAFFAR A. CHISHTI, DORIS MEISSNER, DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU, JAY 
PETERZELL, MICHAEL J. WISHNIE & STEPHEN W. YALE-LOEHR, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., 
AMERICA’S CHALLENGE: DOMESTIC SECURITY, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND NATIONAL UNITY AFTER 
SEPTEMBER 11, at 161 (2003). The announcement prompted a deluge of close to one million 
change-of-address forms to be filed within the year. 
 71.  RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, THE NSEERS EFFECT: A DECADE OF RACIAL PROFILING, 
FEAR, AND SECRECY 15–16 (2012). 
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students and schools where they are enrolled to ensure compliance with the 
terms of student visas.72 
Second, DHS has devoted substantially more resources to post-entry 
investigations.73  In 2002, DHS launched an initiative targeting 
“absconders” or “fugitives,” categories that it defines to include (1) 
individuals with removal orders who have not departed the United States 
and (2) individuals who have otherwise failed to report to ICE when 
required.74  Between 2003 and 2010, funding for these programs spiraled 
from $9 million to over $230 million, increasing the personnel devoted to 
these programs by more than 1300%.75  The operations conducted under 
these programs have involved tactics ranging from undercover 
investigations to high profile, paramilitary-style home and workplace raids 
and blanket community sweeps in apartment complexes, grocery stores, 
laundromats, and parks.76 
Third, federal officials have enlisted hundreds of thousands of state 
and local law enforcement and corrections officials in immigration 
policing.77  These initiatives, whose particular manifestations have evolved 
swiftly, seek to identify potentially deportable noncitizens by screening 
individuals when they are arrested, convicted, and incarcerated to determine 
their citizenship and immigration status and potential deportability.  In 
addition to these federal initiatives, some states and localities unilaterally 
have sought to become directly involved in immigration policing.  For 
example, several states and localities—most prominently Arizona, with its 
controversial and widely-noted Senate Bill 1070—have authorized or 
required law enforcement to inquire about the immigration status of 
individuals they encounter and in some instances to convey that information 
to federal immigration officials.78  While the Supreme Court left open the 
                                                          
 72.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-572, STUDENT AND EXCHANGE 
VISITOR PROGRAM: DHS NEEDS TO ASSESS RISKS AND STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS 
(2012); Romero, supra note 68. 
 73.  See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 62. 
 74.  MARGOT MENDELSON, SHAYNA STROM, & MICHAEL WISHNIE, MIGRATION POL’Y 
INST., COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AN EXAMINATION OF ICE’S FUGITIVE OPERATIONS PROGRAM 
(2009). 
 75.  MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 102. 
 76.  MENDELSON ET AL., supra note 74, at 6–11; NEW ORLEANS WORKERS’ CENTER FOR 
RACIAL JUSTICE, THE CRIMINAL ALIEN REMOVAL INITIATIVE IN NEW ORLEANS: THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION’S BRUTAL NEW FRONTIER IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT (2013); CARDOZO 
IMMIGR. JUSTICE CLINIC, CONSTITUTION ON ICE: A REPORT ON IMMIGRATION HOME RAID 
OPERATIONS (2009); Aldana, supra note 14. 
 77.  Kalhan, supra note 9; see also Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigra-
tion Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 
1579–98 (2010). 
 78.  S.B. 1070 § 2, 49th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2010); see Gabriel J. Chin, Carissa Byrne 
Hessick, Toni Massaro, & Marc L. Miller, A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate 
Bill 1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47 (2010); Kevin Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: Is the 
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possibility of as-applied challenges to Section 2 when it reviewed SB 1070, 
it declined to facially invalidate the provision, and it has previously 
signaled its willingness to tolerate an active role for state and local police in 
direct immigration enforcement.79 
Fourth, federal officials have increasingly deployed removal 
mechanisms involving little or no formal adjudication.  As with expedited 
removal at the border, officials have utilized a number of streamlined 
mechanisms to expel deportable noncitizens without full administrative 
hearings.  For example, DHS has increasingly relied upon stipulated 
removal, by which noncitizens agree to entry of formal removal orders 
while simultaneously waiving the right to full removal hearings before 
immigration judges, and reinstatement of removal, a mechanism that 
permits previous removal orders to be reinstated without further 
adjudication.80  Reinstatements of prior removal orders have steadily 
increased and totaled more than 149,000 in 2012, representing more than 
one-third of all removal orders, and stipulated removal orders are now 
estimated to constitute between ten and thirty percent of all removal 
orders.81  Each year, removal orders are also issued in absentia and without 
further adjudication to thousands of noncitizens who fail to appear for 
hearings, in many cases due to improper notice.82  Expedited removal itself 
also has been extended from the territorial border to the interior of the 
United States, under provisions permitting its application to noncitizens if 
they are apprehended within a zone extending 100 miles from the territorial 
border and are caught within fourteen days of their entry.83  Taken together, 
these means of removal without adjudication have constituted the 
overwhelming majority of formal removals in recent years.  In 2012, for 
example, it is estimated that approximately seventy-five percent of all 
removals were effectuated using these mechanisms, an increase from only 
three percent in 1995 and 1996.84 
                                                          
“New” Birmingham the Same as the “Old” Birmingham?, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 367 
(2012); Kalhan, supra note 1, at 1164–65. 
 79.  Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507–11 (2012); Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 
93, 100–01 (2005); Chacón, supra note 15, at 580 (arguing that Arizona “effectively green-lighted 
systematic state and local participation in immigration enforcement”). 
 80.  Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye): Stipulated Orders of Removal and 
the Crisis in Immigration Adjudication, 91 N.C. L. REV. 475 (2013); Family, supra note 13; 
ROSENBLUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 24–27. 
 81.  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STATS., supra note 8, at 5; Koh, supra 
note 80, at 509–10. 
 82.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGR. REV., FY 2012 STATISTICAL YEAR 
BOOK H1–H4 (2013); see Lenni B. Benson, You Can’t Get There from Here: Managing Judicial 
Review of Immigration Cases, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405, 417–21 (2007). 
 83.  8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2013); A.B.A. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 5, at 1-43 to 
1-44.  Albeit less formally, DHS also induces large numbers of noncitizens to “voluntarily” waive 
rights to full adjudication.  Family, supra note 13. 
 84.  ROSENBLUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 26–27. 
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C.  Indirect Post-Entry Monitoring and Enforcement 
Especially over the past decade, these direct post-entry enforcement 
programs have been supplemented by a growing number of indirect 
enforcement initiatives.85  These indirect initiatives restrict access to rights, 
benefits, and services on the basis of immigration or citizenship status, 
thereby requiring both public and private actors—including social service 
agencies, educational institutions, hospitals, driver’s license bureaus, 
employers, landlords, and transportation carriers—to verify immigration 
and citizenship status to make eligibility determinations.  These initiatives 
enforce immigration law indirectly insofar as they are not always intended 
primarily to apprehend potentially deportable individuals but nevertheless 
seek to encourage “self-deportation.”86  They also can facilitate direct 
enforcement by collecting and storing information that later can be used to 
identify and arrest potentially deportable individuals.  Indirect enforcement 
programs can operate more directly when they require reporting of 
individuals suspected to be potentially deportable to immigration officials.87 
Since 1986, the principal means of indirect enforcement under federal 
law has been the Immigration Reform and Control Act’s (“IRCA”) 
employer sanctions regime, which prohibits employers from knowingly 
hiring unauthorized workers and requires them to verify the identity and 
work eligibility of all new hires.88  Enforcement of IRCA’s civil and 
criminal sanctions has been uneven at best, but since 2006, DHS has 
ramped up its workplace enforcement efforts.89  Under the Obama 
Administration, workplace employment strategies have shifted from high 
profile workplace raids seeking to directly identify and apprehend 
potentially deportable noncitizens to more indirect initiatives monitoring 
employers’ compliance with IRCA’s requirements.90 
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But indirect initiatives to enforce immigration law have not been 
limited to employer sanctions.  For example, Congress has established 
mandatory eligibility restrictions for certain public benefits programs on the 
basis of immigration and citizenship status and has authorized state 
governments to adopt alienage-based restrictions on access to other benefits 
programs.91  Congress has sought to regulate migrants’ access to state-
issued driver’s licenses and other identification documents by mandating 
minimum standards—and in particular, immigration-status-based eligibility 
requirements—for them to be accepted as identification for certain federal 
purposes, such as entering federal buildings or boarding commercial airline 
flights.92  Most recently, in adopting the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Congress explicitly barred unauthorized immigrants from 
participating in the exchanges and temporary high-risk pools established 
under the law or receiving the legislation’s subsidies and credits for health 
insurance premiums.93  Within the executive branch, on occasion federal 
prosecutors have applied the criminal prohibition against transporting 
noncitizens in knowing or reckless disregard of their unlawful entry or 
presence to domestic transportation carriers, such as bus lines.94 
State and local governments also have been active in adopting indirect 
enforcement initiatives.95  For example, some jurisdictions have 
supplemented IRCA with employer sanctions regimes of their own, for 
which the Supreme Court has recently held that IRCA itself leaves some 
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(2010); Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777, 793–96 
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room.96  Other indirect initiatives go well beyond employer sanctions laws 
by significantly expanding the circumstances in which eligibility criteria for 
various services and benefits are based on citizenship or immigration status.  
These initiatives have dramatically expanded the categories of public and 
private actors that are placed in the position of collecting, storing, verifying, 
and disseminating immigration and citizenship status information, together 
with large quantities of other personal information, on a day-to-day basis.97 
D.  Criminal Prosecution of Migration-Related Offenses 
The growing convergence between immigration and criminal law 
enforcement regimes has prompted huge increases in federal criminal 
prosecutions for immigration enforcement purposes.98  Federal prosecutions 
for migration-related offenses have spiked in recent years, from 
approximately 7,000 in 1992 to almost 100,000 in 2013.99  Much of the 
recent increase may be attributed to “Operation Streamline,” an initiative in 
districts along the U.S.-Mexico border in which ICE and CBP officials—
who previously referred only the most severe violations for criminal 
prosecution—routinely refer unlawful border crossers to be prosecuted for 
illegal entry or reentry, rather than informally or formally removing 
them.100  As a result, federal prosecutors now prosecute more migration-
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related offenses than all other categories of crime combined, of which 
approximately two-thirds come from southwestern border districts.101  The 
overwhelming majority of immigration-related criminal convictions have 
been for illegal entry or reentry.  Prosecutions for more serious or complex 
migration-related offenses, such as human smuggling, human trafficking, 
migration-related fraud, and willful hiring of unauthorized workers, remain 
exceedingly less prevalent.102 
E.  Exit Controls 
Finally, DHS has implemented mechanisms to monitor and control 
departures from the United States.  In a series of laws dating back to 1996, 
Congress has mandated the establishment of a comprehensive, automated 
system to monitor and collect records of the departure of every noncitizen 
lawfully admitted to the United States.103  This system seeks to match 
departure records with arrival records to confirm whether noncitizens 
admitted under temporary, nonimmigrant admission categories have 
departed the United States when required and to identify individuals who 
have “overstayed.”  As with screening and registration upon initial entry, a 
complete exit control system necessarily involves monitoring and verifying 
citizenship and immigration status for all individuals traveling from the 
United States.  Increasingly, exit controls have been justified with reference 
to national security and criminal law enforcement.104  At some locations 
along the U.S.-Mexico border, departing individuals are subject to 
additional screening under initiatives that target drug trafficking.105  Other 
mechanisms restrict the ability of noncitizens to travel outside the United 
States altogether.106 
While implementation of this system has proven challenging, the 
federal government has continued to make considerable investments in its 
development and automation.  Under the system in place for many years, 
                                                          
2010), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/arrested-entry-operation-streamline-and-
prosecution-immigration-crimes.  
 101.  MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 93–94. 
 102.  Immigration Prosecutions for April 2014, TRAC IMMIGR., (Jul. 3. 2014), 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/immigration/monthlyapr14/fil. 
 103.  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 
Stat. 3638 (2004); Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 § 414, Pub. L. 
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Im-
provement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-215, 114 Stat. 337 (2000); Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 110, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
 104.  See, e.g., MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 57–59. 
 105.  SEGHETTI, supra note 49, at 20–21. 
 106.  Morawetz, Invisible Border, supra note 40, at 205–20; see also MASSEY ET AL., supra 
note 24, at 105–18, 126–36. 
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nonimmigrants would fill out an I-94 arrival/departure form when seeking 
admission at the border.  Upon admission, border inspectors would stamp 
and retain this form, returning to individuals a departure receipt to be 
submitted to transportation carriers upon departure and then forwarded to 
immigration officials.107  This process has recently been automated for 
individuals arriving by air and sea, and immigration officials have piloted 
automated systems to track exits by verifying and collecting biometric 
identification information from these travelers.108  Immigration reform 
proposals in Congress would go further by requiring air and sea carriers to 
collect exit data from passengers before departing the United States.109 
II.  THE NEW SURVEILLANCE INFRASTRUCTURE OF MASS IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT 
As these immigration enforcement activities have widely proliferated, 
and the scale of the enforcement regime’s “formidable machinery” has 
grown and solidified, authorities have deployed a variety of new 
surveillance, dataveillance, and tracking systems as key components of their 
enforcement strategies at every stage of the migration process.110  In this 
Part, I analyze the swift, extensive, and largely unconstrained 
implementation of these technologies, which have given rise to what I term, 
adapting from Jack Balkin, the immigration surveillance state: an approach 
to immigration governance “that features the collection, collation, and 
analysis of information about populations . . . to identify problems, to head 
off potential threats, to govern populations, and to deliver valuable social 
services.”111  These systems enable and routinize the collection, storage, 
aggregation, processing, and dissemination of detailed personal information 
for immigration control and other purposes on an unprecedented scale and 
facilitate the involvement of an escalating number of federal, state, local, 
private, and non-U.S. actors in immigration control activities. 
                                                          
 107.  ALDEN, supra note 46, at 66. 
 108.  Interim Final Rule, Electronic Form I-94, 78 Fed. Reg. 18457 (Mar. 27, 2013) (codified 
at 8 C.F.R. § 1.4 (2014)); REY KOSLOWSKI, REAL CHALLENGES FOR VIRTUAL BORDERS: THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF US-VISIT 6–7 (2005); Mark Stevens, Exit Tracking: Should the Federal 
Government Track Noncitizens’ Departures from the United States?, 3 AM. U. NAT’L SECURITY 
L. BRIEF 11 (2012).  
 109.  Border Security, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013, S. 
744, 113th Cong. § 3303 (as passed by Senate, June 27, 2013); MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 
58–59; see CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD., TEN REASONS WHY BIOMETRIC EXIT MAY ADVANCE IN 
2014 (2014). 
 110.  MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5; see Edward Alden, Immigration and Border Control, 32 
CATO J. 107, 114 (2012) (“Entry into the United States from overseas now involves passing 
through an extraordinary, high-technology security gauntlet . . . .”). 
 111.  Balkin, supra note 4, at 3 (conceptualizing “national surveillance state”); see Hosein, su-
pra note 23; Kalhan, supra note 9, at 1109–10. 
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First, I develop and articulate a framework within which to analyze 
these developments, disaggregating “immigration enforcement” as a 
category to identify and analyze the specific purposes for which new 
surveillance processes and systems have been implemented.  These 
purposes fall into four broad categories: identifying individuals, screening 
and authorizing individuals, tracking and controlling mobility, and sharing 
information.  Second, I highlight and assess the deployment of new 
technologies—across all of the different enforcement initiatives discussed 
in Part I—to control the territorial border, to monitor and regulate entry, 
exit, and travel by both noncitizens and U.S. citizens, and to monitor and 
regulate noncitizens after entry into the United States. 
A.  The Functions and Practices of Immigration Surveillance 
As conceptualized by John Gilliom and Torin Monahan, surveillance 
involves “the systematic monitoring, gathering, and analysis of information 
in order to make decisions, minimize risk, sort populations, and exercise 
power.”112  In this Section, I identify and analyze a series of specific 
surveillance practices and technologies that have become increasingly 
important components of immigration enforcement strategies.  The 
processes and technologies that comprise the information infrastructure of 
immigration enforcement enable new approaches to four distinct sets of 
surveillance activities: identification, screening and authorization, mobility 
tracking and control, and information sharing. 
1.  Identification 
Perhaps as much as anything else, the recent expansion of immigration 
enforcement has helped spark heightened attention to identification—and in 
particular, the deployment of systems that seek to authenticate or verify the 
identity of a particular individual (“Is this person who she says she is?”) or 
to ascertain the identity of an unknown individual (“Who is this person?” or 
“Who generated this biometric?”).113  Identification mechanisms, of course, 
have always been a central element of immigration regulation.  While one’s 
                                                          
 112.  GILLIOM & MONAHAN, supra note 4, at 2; see LYON, supra note 4, at 14 (defining sur-
veillance as the “focused, systematic, and routine attention to personal details for purposes of in-
fluence, management, protection, or direction”); Roger Clarke, Information Technology and 
Dataveillance, 31 COMM. ACM 498, 499 (1988) (conceptualizing “dataveillance” as “the system-
atic use of personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions . . . of one or 
more persons”); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 490–91 (2005) 
(advancing “taxonomy” of “privacy problems” that arise from collection, processing, and dissem-
ination of personal information). 
 113.  JENNIFER LYNCH, FROM FINGERPRINTS TO DNA: BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION IN 
U.S. IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AND BEYOND 5 (2012); see BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR: 
THINKING SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD, 181–206 (2003) (distinguish-
ing among identification, authentication, and authorization in security systems). 
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identity ordinarily plays no role in most aspects of day-to-day life for either 
noncitizens or U.S. citizens, rules governing admissibility or deportability 
necessarily require authorities to accurately identify and determine the 
particular individuals who are eligible for admission or subject to 
deportation.114  Debates over the proper role and scope of identification 
systems for immigration regulation purposes—including most prominently, 
in recent decades, the potential role of a mandatory, standardized national 
ID card—have accordingly persisted and recurred over many 
generations.115 
Even as debates over the appropriate role of identification systems in 
immigration governance have assumed renewed prominence in recent 
years—as they have, increasingly, in debates about governance more 
generally—a set of de facto national identification systems already are 
taking shape.116  Although current efforts to develop identification systems 
for immigration control purposes have origins in initiatives taken during the 
1990s, the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks has hastened their 
development.  In its reports, the September 11 Commission emphasized the 
ability of the 2001 hijackers to obtain various U.S. identification 
documents, in some cases by fraud, and the failure of immigration and law 
enforcement officials who they had previously encountered to identify them 
and ascertain the threats that they posed.  Accordingly, the Commission 
recommended the establishment of a comprehensive screening system that 
would collect, store, process, and share detailed personal information, along 
with the development of more secure identification documents, in order to 
identify individuals at the border and in a range of other areas of social life 
                                                          
 114.  Kalhan, supra note 1, at 1141–42; see DAVID LYON, IDENTIFYING CITIZENS: ID CARDS 
AS SURVEILLANCE (2009); SCHNEIER, supra note 112. 
 115.  Magdalena Krajewska, The Politics of National Identification Documents in the United 
Kingdom and the United States, 1915–2010, at 257–404 (Aug. 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Brandeis University); see A. MICHAEL FROOMKIN & JONATHAN WEINBERG, HARD TO 
BELIEVE: THE HIGH COST OF A BIOMETRIC IDENTITY CARD (2012); SIMSON GARFINKEL, 
DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 37–67 (2000); JAMES G. 
GIMPEL & JAMES R. EDWARDS, JR., THE CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM 
88–89, 162–63 (1999); Daniel J. Steinbock, National Identity Cards: Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
Issues, 56 FLA. L. REV. 697 (2004). 
 116.  A. Michael Froomkin, The Uneasy Case for National ID Cards, in SECURING PRIVACY 
IN THE INTERNET AGE 295, 308 (Anupam Chander, Lauren Gelman, & Margaret Jane Radin eds., 
2008) (arguing that “enormous growth of the ability to link distributed databases means that we 
already have, or will soon have, a ‘virtual’ national identification system”); see RICHARD L. 
HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN 41–73 
(2012) (discussing voter ID laws); CASSANDRA Q. BUTTS & PETER SWIRE, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS, THE ID DIVIDE (2008); CARL WATNER & WENDY MCELROY, NATIONAL 
IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS: ESSAYS IN OPPOSITION (2004); Cristina Costantini, Municipal ID 
Cards Given To Undocumented Immigrants In Cities Across The U.S. With Varied Success, HUFF. 
POST (Oct. 24, 2011), http://huff.to/qSpa8q. 
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within the United States in order to assess any risks that they might 
present.117 
Infused with this national security significance—and substantial 
resources, as a result—immigration authorities have implemented a 
complex and far-reaching set of identification systems.118  Officials now 
collect large quantities of personal information about both noncitizens and 
U.S. citizens in a variety of different contexts.  In line with the September 
11 Commission’s recommendations—but building upon nascent initiatives 
already under way before the 2001 terrorist attacks—these systems collect 
not only biographic data but also biometric identifiers, which are “unique 
markers that identify or verify the identity of people using intrinsic physical 
or behavioral characteristics,” such as fingerprints, facial recognition-ready 
digital photographs, iris scans, DNA, palm prints, hand vein scans, or voice 
prints.119  Based on the supposition that automated biometric processes 
enable efficient and highly accurate identification of individuals, their use 
has exploded since 2001, with immigration control serving as a leading 
edge of this trend.120 
Immigration authorities store this biographic and biometric 
information in a growing system of interoperable databases.  At the core of 
this database network is DHS’s Automated Biometric Identification System 
(“IDENT”), which INS originally developed to help the Border Patrol 
identify and track individuals unlawfully crossing the U.S.–Mexico border.  
Today, IDENT is used for a much broader variety of immigration and 
security-related functions and constitutes the main DHS-wide biographic 
and biometric information system.121  Growing at a rate of ten million new 
entries per year, IDENT holds records on over 160 million subjects who 
                                                          
 117.  9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 41, at 383–90; see NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST 
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL: STAFF REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (2004) [hereinafter 
TERRORIST TRAVEL REPORT].  
 118.  JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION: A QUEST FOR PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND FREEDOM 
IN A WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE 27–28 (2014); Laura K. Donohue, Technological 
Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 
MINN. L. REV. 407, 425 (2012).  
 119.  LYNCH, supra note 113, at 4; see also 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 41, at 383–90; 
JOSEPH N. PATO & LYNETTE I. MILLETT, BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION: CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 31–36 (2010). 
 120.  SHOSHANA AMIELLE MAGNET, WHEN BIOMETRICS FAIL: GENDER, RACE, AND THE 
TECHNOLOGY OF IDENTITY 10 (2011) (“Biometrics are celebrated as perfect identification tech-
nologies.”); see NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11: 
ADVANCING SCIENCE, ENHANCING OPERATIONS (2008) [hereinafter BIOMETRICS IN 
GOVERNMENT POST-9/11]; Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L.J. 1475 
(2013). 
 121.  System of Records Notice for IDENT, 72 Fed. Reg. 31,080 (June 5, 2007).  Within DHS, 
IDENT is managed by the Office of Biometric Identity Management, which in 2013 replaced a 
program previously known as US-VISIT. 
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have had any contact with DHS, other agencies, and even other 
governments—including visa applicants at U.S. embassies and consulates, 
noncitizens traveling to and from the United States, noncitizens applying 
for immigration benefits (including asylum), unauthorized migrants 
apprehended at the border or at sea, suspected immigration law violators 
encountered or arrested within the United States, and even U.S. citizens 
enrolled in DHS’s registered traveler programs or who have adopted 
children from abroad.  Given its data collection and retention practices, 
IDENT also contains fingerprint records for many naturalized U.S. citizens 
who were fingerprinted before naturalizing and lawfully present 
noncitizens.122  At the same time, IDENT does not include records of 
noncitizens who have never had any contact with DHS, such as those who 
entered the United States without inspection.123 
Finally, Congress and immigration authorities have required both 
noncitizen and U.S. citizen travelers to possess secure identification and 
travel documents that can be linked to these database records.124  
Noncitizens entering the United States under the Visa Waiver Program 
must possess machine-readable passports that incorporate biometric 
identifiers, and the visas issued to other noncitizen travelers by the State 
Department are now tamper-resistant, machine-readable documents that 
include biometric identifiers linked to records in DHS’s databases.  Other 
identification, travel, and entry documents issued to noncitizens, such as 
employment authorization documents and permanent resident cards, have 
similar enhancements.125  U.S. citizen travelers also are subject to enhanced 
identification and travel document requirements.  All U.S. citizens must 
possess a passport or other approved travel document to enter the United 
States, and since 2007, all newly issued U.S. passports have been so-called 
“e-passports.”  These machine-readable documents not only include 
electronically printed digital photographs, but also are embedded with radio 
frequency identification (“RFID”) chips containing biographic and 
biometric data about the document holder that can be read wirelessly and 
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linked to government databases.126  Congress also has enacted legislation 
providing that state driver’s licenses and ID cards may be accepted for 
official purposes by federal agencies only if the state satisfies minimum 
federal standards for eligibility criteria, application procedures, document 
contents, and document security.127 
2.  Analysis, Screening, and Authorization 
Hand-in-hand with these identification systems, policymakers have 
implemented a variety of authorization mechanisms to facilitate large-scale 
analysis and screening of migrants and travelers, once they have been 
identified, in the many settings in which immigration control activities now 
take place and require screening and authorization based on immigration 
status, citizenship status, or other criteria.128  With the widespread 
expansion of immigration enforcement activities, as discussed in Part I, 
these settings are now manifold—ranging from U.S. consulates, airline 
check-in counters, and ports of entry to local police stations, private 
workplaces, benefits agencies, universities, health insurers and providers, 
and beyond.129 
The specific processes and criteria used in these various settings differ 
depending on the particular context and immigration control activities 
involved.  In many instances, screening and authorization can involve 
seemingly straightforward determinations, such as whether individuals are 
noncitizens or U.S. citizens or whether noncitizens are clearly inadmissible 
or deportable.  However, determinations of citizenship status, potential 
inadmissibility or deportability, employment authorization, benefits 
eligibility, and other screening determinations involved in these various 
immigration enforcement programs often can be more complex than they 
appear, requiring collection and synthesis of information from multiple 
sources, interpretation, clarification, analysis, and the exercise of discretion 
                                                          
 126.  Other travel documents approved for U.S. citizens under some circumstances, such as 
passport cards, enhanced driver’s licenses, and registered traveler documents, have similar en-
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 129.  Bosniak, supra note 87, at 90–91. 
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and judgment.130  Moreover, in a growing number of situations, these 
screening determinations are made using predictive, probabilistic risk 
assessments that may be automated or semi-automated.131 
Screening and authorization systems perform two categories of 
interrelated, mutually complementary “sorting” functions.132  On the one 
hand, authorities rely upon information in these systems to identify 
individuals who should be denied authorization in a particular context or 
who are deemed to require closer attention and scrutiny.  For example, 
actors involved in visa processing, border inspection, and immigration 
policing screen the names of individuals whom they encounter against 
information in the FBI’s main criminal records database, the National 
Crime Information Center (“NCIC”)—a clearinghouse that includes 
information on criminal history and outstanding warrants—to determine 
whether they may be inadmissible to enter the United States or potentially 
deportable.133  These officials also screen the names of these individuals 
against watchlists generated from the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Database 
(“TSDB”), a consolidated antiterrorism watchlist containing over one 
million records on approximately 400,000 subjects identified and 
designated as known or suspected terrorists.  Individuals are periodically 
added and removed from the TSDB, and from this master database the FBI 
generates and distributes several more specific lists, such as the No Fly List 
and the Automatic Selectee List, to various immigration control, criminal 
law enforcement, and transportation security authorities in the United States 
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ity, inclusion, access”). 
 133.  Kalhan, supra note 9 (discussing NCIC). 
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and other countries.134  Increasingly, employers subject to employer 
sanctions screen the names of their employees against the federal 
government’s E-Verify database system to determine whether they are 
authorized to work in the United States.135  The Affordable Care Act 
requires electronic verification of citizenship and lawful presence for all 
individuals seeking to purchase health insurance through the government-
established exchanges, to obtain credits or subsidies for health insurance 
premiums, or to secure benefits under Medicaid or the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (“CHIP”).136 
Other systems aggregate and analyze information from a multiplicity 
of sources to furnish automated, probabilistic risk assessments to officials in 
real time, with the goal of identifying unknown individuals whose names 
might not be listed in immigration, criminal records, or antiterrorism 
databases, but whose information matches previously identified profiles and 
who therefore are deemed to warrant closer scrutiny.  For example, CBP’s 
Automated Targeting System (“ATS”), a “decision support tool” originally 
developed by the U.S. Customs Service to screen cargo for illegal drugs and 
other contraband, aggregates detailed information about all travelers 
entering and leaving the United States and assesses the risks presented by 
each of them in order to identify and prioritize individuals deemed to 
warrant greater attention by CBP border inspectors.137  The ATS analyzes 
information collected from a wide variety of different sources, including 
information collected from transportation carriers about travelers and 
information contained in a broad array of other government databases.138  
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For domestic flights, the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening 
System (“CAPPS”) operated by the Transportation Security Administration 
(“TSA”) performs a similar role.139 
On the other hand, these systems (and others) simultaneously are 
intended to perform a second sorting function by facilitating more rapid, 
efficient screening and authorization of individuals who are regarded as 
presenting comparatively low risks.  This second dimension of screening 
and authorization seeks to minimize inconvenience to these individuals but 
also to permit officials to devote greater attention and resources to those 
deemed to present higher risks or more complicated situations.140  With 
massive numbers of people and volumes of goods entering the United 
States, and DHS targeting large numbers of noncitizens for investigation 
and enforcement within the country, officials regard ensuring efficient 
movement by those believed to present low risks as an imperative—in 
order, for example, to prevent cross-border traffic from grinding to a halt, as 
it did in the days immediately following the 2001 terrorist attacks.141  
Similar kinds of efficiency and risk management concerns arise in post-
entry enforcement programs. 
Accordingly, immigration-related screening and authorization 
mechanisms increasingly have been designed with these efficiency- and risk 
management-related objectives in mind. For example, DHS has actively 
encouraged participation in several registered traveler programs—Global 
Entry, NEXUS, SENTRI, FAST, and TSA PreCheck—under which it 
collects, maintains, and analyzes detailed information on individuals who 
have been prescreened and approved as presenting low risks.  Applicants to 
these programs must pay an application fee and submit photographs, 
fingerprints, and detailed personal information—including current and prior 
employment information, current and prior residential addresses, travel 
history, criminal history, and immigration history—and must successfully 
pass an extensive background check, which includes an in-person interview 
and a review of criminal history, customs, immigration, agriculture, and 
national security databases.  Whether or not applicants are approved, this 
information is stored in CBP databases and biometric records are created 
for all applicants in IDENT.  Once approved, these individuals are deemed 
to require more limited scrutiny when entering the United States and are 
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eligible to enroll in TSA’s PreCheck program, a registered traveler program 
for air travelers believed to present limited risks to aviation security.142 
Similarly, at certain ports of entry, CBP has deployed automated 
passport control systems that collect, analyze, and store biographic 
information, photographs, and travel information from arriving individuals 
(currently, only U.S. and Canadian citizens and individuals seeking to enter 
the United States under the Visa Waiver Program) using self-service 
kiosks—or, in a new pilot program, using smartphone applications—rather 
than having CBP inspectors manually collect and process that information 
using paper forms.  Individuals must then present their passport and a 
document generated by the automated system for review by CBP inspectors 
before they may be authorized to enter the United States.  As with its 
registered traveler programs, these new automated systems are intended not 
only to facilitate more efficient entry of individuals deemed to present low 
risks after their information has been analyzed and processed, but also to 
permit officials to identify and sort individuals deemed to present higher 
risks, so that officials may devote greater attention and scrutiny to those 
individuals.143 
3.  Mobility Tracking and Control 
The proliferation of settings in which immigration enforcement 
activities take place also has given rise to extensive government monitoring 
and control over travel and mobility of both noncitizens and U.S. citizens.  
In the wake of the 2001 attacks, travel itself has been deemed a source of 
potential danger to public safety: in the words of the September 11 
Commission, “Targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon against 
terrorists as targeting their money.”144  Accordingly, the Commission 
recommended that border screening systems be integrated into a broader 
network of screening systems covering transportation and other sensitive 
facilities.145  Government authorities have invested heavily to develop and 
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upgrade systems that collect, analyze, store, and disseminate detailed 
information about individuals’ mobility and travel plans—both 
internationally and domestically, and including both noncitizens and U.S. 
citizens.146  These travel and mobility tracking systems have been 
developed within a broader context in which the government’s capacity to 
undertake day-to-day location tracking, using GPS systems, cellular 
telephone location data, automated license plate readers, and other 
mechanisms, has also been significantly enhanced.147  In combination with 
authorization mechanisms that restrict travel for certain individuals, these 
systems have enabled a comprehensive regime that accumulates and stores 
detailed, permanent records about individual travel histories and patterns, 
and enables much individual travel, both international and domestic, only to 
take place upon receipt of affirmative, advance government permission.148 
Several information systems enable this regime of mass surveillance 
and control of travel and mobility.  As discussed below, CBP collects 
several categories of personal and travel information from transportation 
carriers, computerized reservation systems, other government agencies, and 
directly from individual travelers using a variety of mechanisms—
beginning before individuals commence their travel and extending through 
completion of the inspection process at the port of entry.  This information 
is stored within a series of database systems—but even when it does not 
store information in its own systems on travel and mobility, DHS has 
required transportation carriers to provide real time access to obtain this 
information directly from their reservation and departure control systems.149  
In addition, the new e-passports have the technical capacity to include an 
archive of the holder’s travel history, although to date this feature has not 
been activated for U.S. passports. 
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For both noncitizens and U.S. citizens, individuals’ personal and travel 
information is stored within ATS and within TECS, a CBP-managed system 
that officials describe as “one of the largest, most important law 
enforcement systems currently in use,” a “multifaceted computing 
platform” that has evolved into a “system of systems.”150  The system 
includes multiple databases that aggregate and store many different 
categories of personal information, including: 
• Passenger and crew information collected and transmitted by 
transportation carriers; 
• Border crossing information on close to one billion travelers who 
have entered and departed the United States; 
• Records on enrolled participants in DHS’s registered traveler 
programs; 
• State Department records on U.S. citizens who have been issued 
passports and other travel documents and on noncitizen visa 
applicants (including individuals who have been both issued and 
denied visas); 
• USCIS records on over fifty-seven million applicants and 
petitioners for immigration benefits, including both noncitizens 
and U.S. citizens; and 
• Information from other government databases, such as those 
maintained by state motor vehicle departments, that facilitate 
CBP’s identification and admissibility determinations for 
noncitizens and U.S. citizens seeking to enter the United States. 
CBP officials use TECS when determining whether noncitizens and U.S. 
citizens seeking to enter the United States may be admitted.  The system 
enables travelers’ information to be compared against antiterrorism 
watchlists generated by the TSDB, criminal history records in the NCIC, 
risk assessments generated by the ATS, and immigration history records 
within TECS itself.151 
When individuals enter the United States, records of those border 
crossings—including narrative reports containing information that CBP 
inspectors deem relevant to their encounters with travelers—are created and 
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maintained in TECS’s Border Crossing Information System (“BCIS”).  In 
addition, for noncitizens, this travel information also is copied and stored in 
TECS’s Arrival and Departure Information System (“ADIS”), which holds 
detailed biographic and travel records on over 280 million noncitizens who 
have applied for entry, entered, or departed the United States and that are 
linked to the biometric records in IDENT.152  The primary purpose of ADIS 
is to monitor and identify temporary nonimmigrants who may have 
remained in the United States beyond their periods of authorized stay by 
matching records of arrival and departure.153  However, the system also is 
accessed for other immigration control, law enforcement, and national 
security purposes.  In addition to information collected from individual 
travelers and transportation carriers, ADIS also holds information collected 
from colleges and universities on noncitizens admitted on student visas.154 
4.  Information Sharing and Interoperability 
Finally, especially in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks, 
information sharing and interoperability of database systems have become 
high government priorities—particularly for national security purposes, but 
increasingly for other purposes as well.155  Accordingly, both Congress and 
the executive branch have directed the development of a variety of systems 
and processes to disseminate and share information that might be relevant 
for security-related purposes among various actors, including intelligence 
agencies, law enforcement, immigration authorities, international entities, 
foreign governments, and other institutions, both public and private.156  In 
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some instances, these efforts have involved the creation of new institutional 
forms altogether, such as the “fusion centers” authorized by Congress to 
“co-locate” federal, state, and local officials together to work 
collaboratively, along with private contractors, on the collection and 
analysis of intelligence concerning a broad array of potential threats.157  In 
many other instances, they have involved efforts to make government 
databases interoperable and more widely accessible across agency lines. 
This emphasis on interoperability in immigration governance has been 
particularly great as the federal institutions involved in immigration 
regulation have become more fragmented.  With the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security, most immigration policy functions were 
transferred from a single agency within the Department of Justice (the INS) 
to multiple agencies within DHS (USCIS, CBP, and ICE)—even as other 
immigration-related functions have remained vested within the Department 
of Justice, Department of State, Department of Health and Human Services, 
and Department of Labor.  Moreover, as immigration control activities have 
proliferated in a variety of new state, local, and private institutions, and the 
overall scale of enforcement has skyrocketed, the number of public and 
private actors performing immigration enforcement functions has grown 
exponentially.  In this context, the post-2001 emphasis on information 
sharing for national security purposes has also given a boost to initiatives to 
make the technological systems used for immigration control by different 
agencies interoperable with each other and more widely accessible to 
different actors involved in immigration enforcement.158 
In this context, these interoperability initiatives have not simply 
fashioned the “connective tissue” that ties different federal immigration 
agencies together with each other.159  They also integrate those institutions 
with the administrative infrastructure of criminal justice, national security 
and military defense, employment, transportation, and other federal, state, 
local, and private institutions—thereby enabling immigration control and 
enforcement institutions to be used for a range of other purposes.  For 
example, IDENT is now interoperable with the FBI’s Integrated Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System (“IAFIS”), which integrates and stores 
fingerprints and other personal information collected and submitted by 
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and other contributors for 
over 100 million subjects and links those fingerprint records to criminal 
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history records in databases across the country.160  Eventually, both of these 
systems will be made fully interoperable with the Department of Defense’s 
multimodal biometrics database system, Automated Biometric 
Identification System (“ABIS”)—thereby completing the development of 
what the Defense Department refers to as the “biometrics triad.”161  
Increasingly, immigration control systems also have become integrated with 
private information systems, most notably the computerized reservation 
systems and departure control systems of transportation carriers. 
B.  Immigration Enforcement as Immigration Surveillance 
These four sets of migration and mobility surveillance functions—
identification, screening and authorization, mobility tracking and control, 
and information sharing—play crucial but underappreciated roles in 
immigration control processes across the entire spectrum of migration and 
travel.  In the growing number of contexts in which immigration control 
activities now take place, enforcement actors engage in extensive 
collection, storage, analysis, and dissemination of personal information, in 
order to identify individuals, screen them and authorize their activities, 
enable monitoring and control over their travel, and share information with 
other actors who bear immigration control responsibilities.  Initially 
deployed for traditional immigration enforcement purposes, and expanded 
largely in the name of security, these surveillance technologies and 
processes are qualitatively remaking the nature of immigration governance, 
as a number of examples illustrate. 
1.  Border Control 
Despite implementation challenges, Congress and DHS have placed 
new surveillance technologies at the heart of border control strategies.162  
Physical barriers along the U.S.-Mexico border have been supplemented 
with advanced lighting, motion sensors, remote cameras, and mobile 
surveillance systems, and DHS has deployed a fleet of unmanned aerial 
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vehicles to monitor coastal areas and land borders.163  To date, these drones 
primarily have been used to locate illegal border crossers and individuals 
suspected of drug trafficking in remote areas using ultra high-resolution 
cameras, thermal detection sensors, and other surveillance technologies.164  
However, drones also have been used to patrol and monitor activities within 
Mexico itself.165  In addition, government documents indicate that DHS’s 
drones are capable of intercepting wireless communications and may 
eventually incorporate facial recognition technology linked to the agency’s 
identification databases.166  According to one official, CBP’s drones can 
“scan large swaths of land from 20,000 feet up in the air while still being 
able to zoom in so close that footprints can be seen on the ground.”167  The 
DHS has plans both to expand its fleet of drones and to increase their 
surveillance capabilities, and immigration reform proposals in Congress 
would significantly build upon these recent expansions.168 
2.  Overseas Visa Issuance and Refugee Processing 
In 2001, Congress mandated the State Department to conduct 
biometric screening for all visa applications, and by 2004, diplomatic posts 
worldwide were collecting fingerprints from all visa applicants along with 
photographs, biographic information, background information, and other 
personal details.169  The State Department maintains records on all visa 
applications, including both issuances and denials, in its Consular 
Consolidated Database (“CCD”), which holds biometric and biographic 
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records on over 100 million visa cases and grows at a rate of approximately 
35,000 visa cases per day.170  The CCD also holds records on all applicants 
for U.S. passports and other U.S. citizen services.  Through CCD, consular 
officials run name checks on applicants against the Consular Lookout and 
Support System (“CLASS”)—a State Department database containing over 
twenty-six million records collected from individual applicants and the 
databases of numerous other government agencies—in order to identify 
individuals who may be ineligible for visa issuance or warrant special 
handling.171  Now, CCD is also interoperable with DHS’s IDENT and the 
FBI’s IAFIS systems, which enables consular officials to share visa 
information and run biometric checks against records in those databases, 
and with ATS.172  At some diplomatic posts, consular officials have access 
to ADIS, which enables them to determine whether applicants have 
previously “overstayed” while in the United States.  Additional screening is 
conducted by DHS agents assigned to certain diplomatic posts, who have 
access to TECS and other databases and who conduct more in-depth 
analysis and investigation of applicants as necessary.  With the deployment 
of new technologies that permit remote review of visa applications by 
personnel in the United States, this additional layer of DHS review is being 
extended to all visa applications worldwide.173 
Overseas processing of refugees also now involves an intensive 
process of information collection, screening, and dissemination, including 
biographic and biometric background checks against the databases of 
multiple government agencies.174  In a recent pilot program, the State 
Department collected and tested DNA from African refugees seeking to 
reunite with relatives in the United States in order to detect fraudulent 
family reunification claims.  As a result of that pilot program, the State 
Department suspended its refugee family reunification program in certain 
parts of Africa, and when it resumed that program in 2012, the State 
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Department instituted rules that made DNA testing mandatory to establish 
the legitimacy of certain claimed family relationships.175 
3.  Entry, Exit, and Travel Control 
CBP and TSA collect, analyze, store, and disseminate large quantities 
of detailed personal information and travel history about both noncitizens 
and U.S. citizens arriving in or departing from the United States by air or 
sea before they commence their travel.  More recently, this same basic 
system has been extended to domestic travel by air within the United States, 
thereby integrating the surveillance and tracking mechanisms for both 
domestic and international travel.  As a result of these systems, much travel 
now only can take place after carriers receive affirmative, advance 
government permission to permit individuals to travel—without travelers 
themselves necessarily being made fully aware of the need for that 
permission—and is accompanied by collection, aggregation, and storage of 
detailed personal information and travel histories for millions of noncitizens 
and U.S. citizens. 
The information collected consists of several categories of overlapping 
but distinct data.  First, noncitizen visitors seeking to enter the United States 
by air or sea without visas, under the Visa Waiver Program, must apply 
online for authorization before commencing their travel.  These individuals 
are required to submit biographic and travel information and to answer 
questions concerning their eligibility using the Electronic System for Travel 
Authorization (“ESTA”), and carriers must verify compliance before 
permitting them to board. ESTA shares this information with the National 
Counterterrorism Center and automatically screens this information against 
antiterrorism, immigration control, and criminal law enforcement databases, 
using ATS and other TECS databases, to determine whether these would-be 
visitors present threats to aviation security or national security, are of 
interest to law enforcement, or may be inadmissible for some other reason.  
Like visas, travel authorizations under ESTA, which are valid for two years, 
do not establish or guarantee admissibility, and by the same token, 
individuals who have been denied authorization are directed to U.S. 
diplomatic posts where consular official may issue visas to those 
individuals or otherwise resolve the issue.176 
                                                          
 175.  ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND 
RESETTLEMENT POLICY 5–6 (2014); Emily Holland, Moving the Virtual Border to the Cellular 
Level: Mandatory DNA Testing and the U.S. Refugee Family Reunification Program, 99 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1635 (2011); see also JILL ESBENSHADE, IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR., AN ASSESSMENT OF DNA 
TESTING FOR AFRICAN REFUGEES, 4 (2010) (analyzing pilot program and raising concerns that 
“DNA testing in the refugee context may portend required DNA testing in other areas of immigra-
tion admissions”). 
 176.  8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(9)–(11), (g), (h)(3) (2013); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-11-335, VISA WAIVER PROGRAM: DHS HAS IMPLEMENTED THE ELECTRONIC SYSTEM FOR 
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Second, as discussed above, Congress has required air and sea carriers 
traveling to and from the United States to transmit all passenger and crew 
manifest information to U.S. officials before departure, including both 
noncitizens’ and U.S. citizens’ information.  Non-U.S.-based air carriers 
must also submit this information for flights within or overflying the United 
States.177  This advance passenger information (“API”) consists of basic 
personal information collected from the traveler’s passport and other travel 
documents but also includes information collected from the carrier’s own 
reservations and departure control systems, such as flight or vessel details.  
API data also includes information collected directly from travelers at 
check-in, including information on the individual’s travel and U.S. 
destination.178  Noncitizen travelers who decline to provide this information 
may be inadmissible, and U.S. citizens who decline to provide this 
information may be prohibited from traveling by the carrier or subjected to 
greater scrutiny upon arrival in the United States.179 
Through its Advance Passenger Information System (“APIS”), CBP 
begins receiving this information in batches as early as seventy-two hours 
prior to departure and analyzes and compares this information in real time 
against information in the No Fly and Selectee watchlists generated by the 
TSDB.  When this review is complete, CBP either clears the carrier to issue 
a boarding pass, instructs the carrier to conduct additional security 
screening, or directs the carrier not to issue a boarding pass.180  As 
discussed above, CBP also stores this information in the BCIS and ADIS 
                                                          
TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION, BUT FURTHER STEPS NEEDED TO ADDRESS POTENTIAL PROGRAM 
RISKS (2011); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR 
THE ELECTRONIC SYSTEM FOR TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION (ESTA) (2008); see also Statement by 
Secretary Johnson on Security Enhancements to the Visa Waiver Program, DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC. (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/11/03/statement-secretary-johnson-security-
enhancements-visa-waiver-program (discussing expansion of biographic and travel information 
required to be submitted via ESTA). As with individuals who have been issued visas, border in-
spectors are authorized to make their own, de novo determinations as to whether individuals seek-
ing to enter the United States under the Visa Waiver Program are admissible.  8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1187(a), 1201(h), 1235(a). 
 177.  49 U.S.C. § 44909(c)(1)–(2) (2013); Final Rule, Advance Electronic Transmission of 
Passenger and Crew Manifests for Commercial Aircraft and Vessels, 72 Fed. Reg. 48,320 (Aug. 
23, 2007).  These advance passenger information sharing requirements also have been extended to 
private air carriers, and similar information sharing protocols also have been implemented on a 
voluntary basis with Amtrak and certain private bus carriers.  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
PRIVACY OFFICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE ADVANCE PASSENGER INFORMATION 
SYSTEM (APIS) (2008);  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, PRIVACY IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT FOR THE ADVANCED PASSENGER INFORMATION SYSTEM—VOLUNTARY RAIL AND 
BUS SUBMISSIONS (APIS-VRBS) (2008). 
 178.  KROUSE & ELIAS, supra note 134, at 25. 
 179.  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, supra note 47. 
 180.  19 C.F.R. § 122.49a(b)(1)(ii) (2014); see Final Rule, Advance Electronic Transmission of 
Passenger and Crew Manifests for Commercial Aircraft and Vessels, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48323–24 . 
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databases within TECS and compares it against other government databases 
to facilitate customs and immigration clearance upon arrival. 
Third, Congress and DHS have required international air and sea 
carriers to transmit passenger name record (“PNR”) data to U.S. officials 
prior to departure to or from the United States, and to give U.S. officials the 
ability to also access this information directly from airlines’ reservation and 
departure control systems.181  PNR data overlaps with but is broader than 
API data.  Depending on the particular configuration of the carrier’s 
reservations and departure control systems, PNR data can include not only 
the traveler’s biographic data, contact information, and basic travel data, but 
also detailed information on the individual’s travel, including the full 
itinerary for the trip, transactional details about the reservation (including 
notations of all changes), payment and billing details, frequent flier 
program information, baggage and seat information, information about 
travel companions and other parts of the individual’s trip, and comments by 
reservation systems or travel agents on special issues or requests (such as 
special meal requests or particular medical needs).182  CBP stores PNR data 
in ATS and, as discussed above, compares and analyzes this information 
against a broad array of government databases in order to assess terrorism-
related risks the traveler is deemed to present.183 
Finally, under TSA’s “Secure Flight” program, airlines must send TSA 
basic biographic information, referred to as “Secure Flight Passenger Data” 
(“SFPD”), for all passengers traveling by air—including international 
flights that arrive in, depart from, or overfly the United States and domestic 
flights within the United States.  While overlapping in some respects, the 
data collection process for Secure Flight differs from CBP’s API and PNR 
data collection processes in both timing and content.  When passengers 
make flight reservations, carriers must request basic biographic information 
from them as it appears on an approved identification document.  Then, 
seventy-two hours before the scheduled departure time (or at the time of the 
reservation, for reservations made within seventy-two hours of departure), 
the carrier must transmit this information to TSA via APIS along with other 
information in the airline’s reservation systems, including itinerary details, 
PNR record locator, and, if already available to the airline, the traveler’s 
                                                          
 181.  49 U.S.C. § 44909(c)(3) (2013); Interim Rule, Passenger Name Record Information Re-
quired for Passengers on Flights in Foreign Air Transportation to or from the United States, 67 
Fed. Reg. 42,710, 42,712 (June 25, 2002) (codified at 19 C.F.R. § 122.49d (2014)). 
 182.  EDWARD HASBROUCK, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT PNR DATA (2012), 
http://hasbrouck.org/IDP/EU-PNR-FAQ.pdf; Edward Hasbrouck, What’s in a Passenger Name 
Record (PNR)?, THE PRACTICAL NOMAD, http://hasbrouck.org/articles/PNR.html; see also 
KROUSE & ELIAS, supra note 134, at 26. 
 183.  KROUSE & ELIAS, supra note 134, at 9–11. 
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passport information.184  CBP (for international flights) or TSA (for 
domestic flights) then compares and analyzes that information against the 
No Fly and Selectee Lists generated by the TSDB. As with the API process, 
the airline is either cleared to issue a boarding pass, instructed to conduct 
additional security screening, or directed not to issue a boarding pass.185 
When flights and vessels arrive in the United States, CBP inspectors 
compare the information in the arriving passengers’ travel documents with 
the API data transmitted prior to departure and a series of other government 
databases.  Officials now also collect biometric data at almost all ports of 
entry from most categories of noncitizens arriving in the United States, 
including virtually all individuals arriving by air or sea and many 
individuals arriving by land.186  As discussed above, records of all border 
crossings are recorded in the BCIS database within TECS and, for 
noncitizens, within ADIS. 
4.  Post-Entry Enforcement 
With both direct and indirect immigration enforcement activities 
increasingly taking place after individuals have entered the United States, as 
discussed in Part I, surveillance processes and technologies that enable 
collection, processing, storage, and dissemination of personal information 
have also proliferated to facilitate those enforcement activities.187  A 
number of examples illustrate these developments: 
Monitoring and Registration.  The NSEERS program initiated in the 
aftermath of the 2001 attacks, which is discussed above, required Arab and 
Muslim nonimmigrant men (1) to be fingerprinted and photographed upon 
arrival in the United States (or to appear for registration if already in the 
United States), (2) if they remained in the country longer than thirty days, to 
periodically report for in-person interviews, and (3) to register again when 
departing the United States.188  Biometric identifiers collected from these 
individuals have been enrolled in IDENT, and other personal information 
and narrative reports of NSEERS interviews—and of the “voluntary” 
interviews conducted by the FBI have been stored in other government 
databases.189  By the end of 2003, officials had collected information on 
approximately 83,000 registrants, leading to the deportation of almost 
                                                          
 184.  Final Rule, Secure Flight Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,018 (Oct. 28, 2008); Secure Flight: 
Frequently Asked Questions, IDENTITY PROJECT, http://papersplease.org/sf_faq.html. 
 185.  Final Rule, Secure Flight Program, 73 Fed. Reg. at 64,019. 
 186.  Final Rule, Enrollment of Additional Aliens in US-VISIT, 73 Fed. Reg. 77,473 (Dec. 19, 
2008); SEGHETTI, supra note 49, at 23–24.   
 187.  See supra Parts I.B–C. 
 188.  RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, supra note 71, at 15–16.  
 189.  CHISHTI ET AL., supra note 70, at 18–19, 41; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., INFORMATION SHARING ON FOREIGN NATIONALS: BORDER SECURITY 
(REDACTED) 4–6, 9–11 (2012).   
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14,000 individuals.190  When the Obama Administration partially suspended 
NSEERS in 2011, it already had been partially superseded by more general 
entry-exit tracking mechanisms, but the Administration did not terminate 
the program altogether or foreclose its future use.  Information collected 
under NSEERS continues to be maintained and used by DHS—for 
example, by CBP’s Automated Targeting System when making its 
automated risk assessments.191 
Congress also has mandated more extensive ongoing monitoring of 
international students and exchange visitors, requiring educational 
institutions to share enrollment status and other personal information on 
these individuals and their dependents with DHS and expanding the FBI’s 
ability to obtain student records that otherwise would be protected from 
disclosure.192  To implement these mandates, DHS has developed the 
Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (“SEVIS”), a database 
system through which schools must regularly report personal information 
about international students—including their enrollment status, class 
attendance, changes in majors, disciplinary action, or early graduation—and 
their dependents.193  DHS officials use SEVIS not only to monitor and 
identify international students who may have fallen out of lawful 
nonimmigrant status but also to “identify patterns of criminal activity, 
including terrorism” and to “identify trends and patterns to assist in 
planning and analyzing risks.”194 
Immigration Policing. Interoperable databases now play a powerful 
role in federal programs to enlist state and local law enforcement and 
corrections officers in the identification of potentially deportable 
noncitizens by enabling automatic, routine, and effectively mandatory 
                                                          
 190.  RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, supra note 71, at 26–29.  While NSEERS remained active 
until April 2011 and continues to have a number of residual effects, no authoritative data is avail-
able concerning the number of individuals affected since 2003.  Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Busi-
ness as Usual: Immigration and the National Security Exception, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1485, 
1507–08 (2010). 
 191.  System of Records Notice for Automated Targeting System, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,297, 
30297–303 (May 22, 2012); Removing Designated Countries From NSEERS, 76 Fed. Reg. 
23,830, 23,830–01 (Apr. 28, 2011); RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, supra note 71.  
 192.  Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act §§ 501–502, Pub. L. No. 107-153, 
116 Stat. 543 (2002); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001 §§ 416, 507, Pub. L. No. 
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
§ 641, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).  
 193.  Romero, supra note 68; see also ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MONITORING 
FOREIGN STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE STUDENT AND EXCHANGE VISITOR 
INFORMATION SYSTEM (SEVIS) (2005). 
 194. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-690, PERFORMANCE OF INFORMATION 
SYSTEM TO MONITOR FOREIGN STUDENTS AND EXCHANGE VISITORS HAS IMPROVED, BUT 
ISSUES REMAIN 67 (2004); see also SHANNON R. ANDERSON, BILL OF RIGHTS DEFENSE COMM., 
TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS AND BEYOND: THE DANGERS OF USING DATA MINING 
TECHNOLOGY TO PREVENT TERRORISM 7–8 (2004). 
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immigration status determinations by these officers in the course of their 
day-to-day responsibilities.  Under DHS’s “Secure Communities” program, 
fingerprints that are recorded and transmitted to the FBI’s IAFIS database 
(to obtain identification and criminal history information as part of the 
typical post-arrest booking process) are now simultaneously transmitted to 
DHS for comparison against records in IDENT.  If the fingerprints match a 
record in IDENT—or even if there is no match, but the individual has an 
unknown or non-U.S. place of birth—the system automatically flags the 
record for further review.  Based on enforcement priorities and other 
factors, ICE may decide to initiate removal proceedings against the 
individual and issue a detainer requesting that the state or local agency hold 
the individual for transfer of custody.  A second automated immigration 
policing program enables automatic identification of suspected immigration 
law violators by including automatic searches of civil immigration records 
whenever state and local law enforcement officers search the NCIC to 
obtain information on criminal history and outstanding warrants on 
individuals who they encounter.  Both programs have been implemented in 
a manner that makes participation effectively mandatory for states and 
localities.195 
Immigration Benefits Applications.  Just as the State Department does 
with individuals applying for visas and refugee status from overseas, DHS, 
through USCIS, collects, stores, analyzes, and disseminates significant 
amounts of personal information from individuals affirmatively applying 
for parole, adjustment of status, asylum, employment authorization, lawful 
permanent resident status, naturalization, and other immigration benefits 
within the United States.  USCIS maintains and tracks benefits applications 
using its Central Index System, which is able to access over fifty-seven 
million records concerning the individuals who have applied for these 
immigration benefits in a variety of different case management database 
systems.196  Collection of fingerprints from immigration benefits applicants 
has become routine, and serious consideration has been given to routine 
collection of other biometric data, most notably DNA.197  Officials conduct 
background checks against a variety of other government databases.198  
USCIS has even used social networking platforms to conduct surveillance 
on individuals seeking to naturalize.  The agency has instructed its officials 
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to “friend” petitioners for naturalization and their beneficiaries on social 
networks in an apparent effort to detect potential grounds upon which those 
petitions might be denied, such as the failure to meet the legal standard for a 
genuine marriage.199 
Employment Eligibility Verification.  The process by which employers 
verify whether their new hires are eligible to work in the United States is 
undergoing a significant transformation with the implementation of 
USCIS’s E-Verify system.  Under this pilot program, which was first 
authorized and initiated during the 1990s, employers collect personal 
information from the identification and work authorization documents that 
employees already must present under the existing, paper-based verification 
process and submit that information through the online E-Verify system.  
The system then attempts to match the individual’s data with records 
contained in databases maintained by DHS, the State Department, and the 
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) in order to determine whether the 
individual is authorized to work in the United States.  If the system finds a 
match, then the employer is informed that the individual is authorized to 
work.  If there is no match, or there are discrepancies between the 
information submitted and the database records, the system will issue a 
“tentative non-confirmation” and direct the employer to refer the employee 
to either DHS or SSA to resolve the issue.  If the issue is not resolved 
within eight days, the employer will be informed that the individual is not 
authorized to work.200 
While formally still a pilot program that remains voluntary for most 
employers, E-Verify has grown extensively in the past ten years due to a 
series of federal, state, and local mandates.  In 2008, the Bush 
Administration mandated the system’s use by federal contractors and 
subcontractors, and the Obama Administration has maintained the 
requirement.201  In addition, while some states have sought to limit the 
system’s use by employers within their jurisdictions, a growing number of 
states and localities have mandated its use by various categories of 
employers.202  Leading reform proposals would dramatically extend the 
reach of this system—not only by requiring all employers to use E-Verify 
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but also by enhancing the system to incorporate biometric identification 
mechanisms and, potentially, by making the employment verification 
system interoperable with other database systems.203 
Public Benefits, Services, and Licenses Eligibility Verification.  
Somewhat less visibly than some of their other database systems, such as 
Secure Communities and E-Verify, federal immigration authorities have 
developed the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (“SAVE”) 
program, which enables federal, state, and local government agencies to 
verify immigration status information for individuals applying for an ever-
growing variety of public benefits and services.204  Now administered and 
maintained by USCIS, SAVE was initially authorized by IRCA in 1986 to 
enable officials to obtain immigration status information from INS in order 
to determine applicants’ eligibility for certain specified federally funded 
benefits programs.205  Since then—with significant expansions in the extent 
to which federal, state, and local authorities have restricted eligibility for 
services and benefits on the basis of immigration and citizenship status—
the ambit of the SAVE program has been extended to encompass a broader 
range of federal, state, and local benefits, services, licenses, grants, and 
other programs.206 
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Over one thousand agencies now access SAVE, including federal, 
state, and local benefits agencies and state drivers’ licenses bureaus.  SAVE 
also is used by agencies that conduct federal security clearances and 
background investigations on individuals to verify the immigration status of 
those individuals and their family members, cohabitants, and other 
affiliates, and by military officials in the course of their recruitment 
activities.207  To implement the large scale eligibility verification 
requirements established by the Affordable Care Act, which are discussed 
above, federal authorities have integrated SAVE with the systems created 
by the Department of Health and Human Services to operate the exchanges 
established under the legislation.208 
SAVE does not itself furnish any eligibility determinations but rather 
provides immigration status information from its systems upon which the 
many federal, state, and local agencies requesting that information make 
those determinations themselves using their own applicable criteria.  Those 
agencies collect personal information from applicants and other sources and 
transmit that information to SAVE using an online system.  As with E-
Verify, the SAVE system then attempts to match the individual’s data 
against a series of government databases that contain over 100 million 
records, the majority of which are maintained by agencies other than 
USCIS.  If the SAVE system identifies a matching record, it provides the 
requesting agency with information concerning the individual’s 
immigration status.  If it does not find a match, SAVE instructs the agency 
to take additional steps, in consultation with USCIS officials, to verify the 
individual’s immigration status.209  Recent enhancements to SAVE enable 
agencies to transmit photographs for comparison against digital 
photographs in government databases.210 
Public Health Surveillance.  Public health officials have also 
implemented systems to conduct disease surveillance on noncitizens who 
have entered the United States.  Individuals long have been inadmissible on 
certain public health-related grounds, and Congress has required individuals 
seeking admission to undergo medical examinations in their countries of 
origin before being issued immigrant visas or being admitted as refugees.  
Individuals seeking to enter as nonimmigrants can be required to undergo 
medical examinations upon arrival at ports of entry.211  To implement these 
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inadmissibility provisions and the statutory obligation to prevent 
communicable diseases from being introduced and transmitted within the 
United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has 
established the Electronic Disease Notification system, which collects and 
stores health information on these individuals and transmits that health 
information to state and local public health authorities and refugee 
resettlement authorities when noncitizens with certain specified health 
conditions enter their jurisdictions.212 
Detention and Removal.  Finally, both ICE and the Department of 
Justice’s Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”), which 
supervises the immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals, 
maintain systems to collect, store, analyze, and disseminate information 
about noncitizens who have been investigated or charged as inadmissible or 
deportable, booked and placed in removal proceedings, held in detention or 
alternative forms of custody, and removed from the United States.  ICE’s 
Enforcement Integrated Database (“EID”), which officials access using a 
system referred to as ENFORCE, stores this information in several separate 
modules.  ENFORCE also enables ICE officials to access information in 
other database systems, such as the FBI’s NCIC system and DHS’s IDENT 
database.213  A component in ENFORCE also is used to generate automated 
risk assessments for individuals when they are booked, which ICE uses to 
determine whether and under what kinds of circumstances individuals 
should be detained.214  EOIR maintains case management information in its 
Case Access System for EOIR (“CASE”).215  These systems have facilitated 
the significant increases seen in recent years in the number of individuals 
detained and removed.  For example, enrollment in IDENT has enabled 
expanded use of reinstatement of removal.216 
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III.  LEGALIZATION AND THE IMMIGRATION SURVEILLANCE STATE 
These broad expansions in the scope of immigration enforcement, 
together with major investments to construct the technological 
infrastructure to support those expansions, have given rise to what I 
described above as the immigration surveillance state.217  In its current 
incarnation, the immigration surveillance state has most visibly facilitated a 
regime of mass detention and deportation.  However, as an approach to 
governance, immigration surveillance runs much deeper, encompassing a 
broader range of activities that both control and facilitate migration and 
mobility of both noncitizens and U.S. citizens, both within and outside the 
United States.  Accordingly, in this Part, I explain why comprehensive 
immigration reform and other legalization proposals, while holding the 
potential to drastically reduce the number of noncitizens subject to removal 
from the United States, are not only unlikely to slow or reverse the 
development of the immigration surveillance state but, to the contrary, are 
likely to consolidate and extend its reach.218 
To begin with, comprehensive approaches to immigration reform 
conventionally have been understood to entail a pairing between two sets of 
objectives: regularization of current undocumented immigrants and 
increased future immigrant and nonimmigrant flows, on the one hand, along 
with increased investments in border control and immigration enforcement, 
on the other.219  Accordingly, like IRCA’s legalization provisions in 1986, 
the past decade’s leading comprehensive reform proposals—from the Bush 
Administration’s reform principles in 2004, to the bills passed by the Senate 
in 2006 and 2013, to the Obama Administration’s reform principles in 
2013, to the reform principles briefly floated by House Republicans in 
January 2014—all forcefully pledge major investments to expand 
immigration enforcement activities across all of the many domains in which 
they now take place, including further investments in the new technologies 
used to fashion the immigration surveillance state. 
However, legalization also reinforces immigration surveillance at an 
even more basic level.  Like other aspects of immigration governance, 
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legalization programs—even if they take the form of straightforward 
“amnesty” rather than the more demanding “earned legalization” that 
today’s leading proposals contemplate—necessarily require identification, 
screening, and authorization of individuals to determine whether they meet 
certain eligibility criteria and to formally confer the legal status that they 
seek.  For example, IRCA’s legalization program—which granted 
permanent residence to individuals meeting the relatively straightforward 
criteria of having resided in the United States before a specified cutoff date 
or having performed agricultural work for at least ninety days during the 
prior year—required applicants to provide documentation establishing their 
identity, residence, financial responsibility, and proof of employment; to be 
fingerprinted and photographed; and to appear for an in-person interview.220 
The “earned legalization” approaches contemplated by today’s 
comprehensive reform proposals are considerably more complex, involving 
stringent initial eligibility criteria and long probationary periods during 
which applicants must satisfy a series of continuing obligations to “earn” 
legal status.221  For example, under the initial eligibility criteria in the 
Senate’s 2013 reform bill, applicants not only must satisfy a durational 
residence requirement but also must not have convictions for specified 
offenses; pay an application fee, a penalty, and any back taxes; submit 
biometric and biographic data; and successfully complete national security, 
criminal law, and immigration background checks.  After extended periods 
of time in this provisional status, individuals may adjust to permanent 
resident status if they continue to satisfy the initial eligibility criteria, 
successfully complete a second set of background checks, and meet a series 
of additional prospective criteria, such as obtaining employment, satisfying 
minimum income requirements, remaining continuously physically present 
in the United States, registering for the military draft, meeting English 
language proficiency and civics knowledge requirements, and others.222 
To implement and monitor compliance with these requirements, 
authorities invariably will turn to the techniques and technologies of 
immigration surveillance—collecting, storing, analyzing, and disseminating 
vast quantities of information on millions of eligible noncitizens, on an 
ongoing basis, to identify and ascertain who qualifies for legalization and, 
ultimately, for adjustment to lawful permanent resident status.  In a world in 
which the availability of more information is almost always assumed to be 
better, the likelihood of long retention periods and secondary use of that 
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data for purposes not contemplated at the time of collection is quite high.223  
By definition, not every unauthorized migrant will be able to regularize his 
or her status.  Those who ultimately fall short of these requirements and 
remain undocumented—an enduring population that, as Michael Wishnie 
describes, will effectively become “super-undocumented,” even more 
deeply in the shadows than current undocumented immigrants—will 
continue to face the entire spectrum of enforcement practices, processes, 
and penalties that have emerged in recent decades, if not more aggressive 
and intrusive mechanisms of surveillance and control.224 
Albeit on a comparatively modest scale, the Obama Administration’s 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program offers a 
glimpse at how immigration reform reinforces the immigration surveillance 
state.225  Strictly speaking, DACA involves a categorical but temporary 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, but the “DACAmented” status it 
confers should be understood as a form of quasi-legalization.226  The 
program permits unlawfully present noncitizens under the age of thirty-one 
to request a renewable, two-year period of temporary relief from 
deportation and employment authorization if they arrived in the United 
States while below age sixteen; have continuously resided in the United 
States since June 15, 2007; are currently enrolled in school, graduated from 
high school or a GED program, or received an honorable U.S. military 
discharge; have not been convicted of certain specified criminal offenses; 
and do not otherwise present any threat to national security or public 
safety.227 
DACA applicants must submit documentation to USCIS establishing 
their identity and fulfillment of these eligibility criteria.  In addition, USCIS 
collects detailed biographic information and biometrics (photographs, 
fingerprints, and signatures) from all applicants in order to conduct criminal 
history and national security background checks against FBI’s IAFIS, 
DHS’s TECS, and other government databases, and to enroll individuals 
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into IDENT if their biometric records are not already included.228  Experts 
have estimated that as many as 1.8 million individuals could be eligible for 
DACA, and as of March 2014, over 673,000 DACA applications had been 
received.229 
Whether as part of comprehensive immigration reform or in some 
other incarnation, any legalization program that Congress ultimately might 
adopt would invariably require—on a much larger scale—similar processes 
of data collection, processing, storage, and dissemination of personal 
information.230  While legalization usually is framed in public discourse as 
a means of advancing justice, compassion, and human dignity, advocates 
and policymakers increasingly characterize legalization as a means of 
achieving instrumental objectives closely tied to the logic of immigration 
surveillance.  For example, some legalization advocates emphasize the 
social harms that arise from a large “underground shadow population” and 
the benefits legalization would bring by enabling authorities to “learn the 
names and addresses of the nation’s inhabitants.”231  Especially in the wake 
of the 2001 attacks, these instrumental arguments are frequently advanced 
in the name of national security and public safety: 
[T]he security dangers of allowing a large, unauthorized 
population to remain are substantial.  Effective homeland security 
requires that the U.S. government know who is living in this 
country to the greatest extent possible.  It is simply not safe to 
allow so many to live a shadow existence in the country.  Efforts 
at deportation will only drive such people further underground in 
an effort to evade immigration enforcement, when U.S. security 
would be better served by making their presence here lawful.232 
With these pragmatic concerns front and center, the task of making 
unauthorized noncitizens visible and legible to government authorities 
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invariably becomes a central objective in any legalization scheme.233  To 
that end, the logic, practices, and institutions of immigration surveillance—
of identification, screening and authorization, mobility tracking and control, 
and information sharing—also become critical. 
IV.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION SURVEILLANCE 
What happens when technology, surveillance, and information are 
placed at the heart of immigration governance?  In this Part, I identify and 
discuss several consequences of this transformation, analyzing immigration 
surveillance within the context of a broader set of developments, extending 
beyond immigration regulation itself, concerning the role of technology, 
surveillance, and information in contemporary governance.  First, I high-
light the ways in which immigration surveillance has deterritorialized the 
national border for migration and mobility purposes, which complicates and 
blurs lines of oversight and accountability by dramatically expanding both 
the actors conducting immigration control activities and the locations where 
those activities take place.  Second, I identify and analyze two sets of 
concerns arising from these developments that highlight the need for 
stronger accountability mechanisms: the risks and fallibilities arising from 
automation and the risks that immigration surveillance systems will later be 
deployed for secondary purposes not contemplated at the time of 
implementation.  Across all of the many domains in which immigration 
surveillance takes place, these risks increasingly impose the costs of 
immigration control upon U.S. citizens and noncitizens with lawful status in 
the United States. 
A.  Deterritorializing the Migration Border 
Borders, it is routinely observed, are malleable constructions rather 
than fixed realities: “less than definite, permeable, and subject to shifts and 
changes.”234  As such, to speak of “the border” in the context of 
immigration governance can be misleading and insufficiently nuanced.  
While territorial borders have long played a constitutive role in defining 
nation-state sovereignty under international law, like other kinds of 
boundaries they can be relevant and important for some purposes but not 
for others, and in varying degrees.235 In some contexts, nonterritorial 
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demarcations are more consequential than territorial borders.  The 
significance and meanings given to both territorial and nonterritorial 
boundaries are legally, politically, socially, economically, and culturally 
defined, and can evolve and shift over time.236 
The deployment of new technologies and practices of immigration 
surveillance has accelerated a long-term process of decoupling the 
territorial border of the United States from what I term its migration border: 
the set of boundary points at which nation-states authorize individuals to 
enter or be admitted, prevent or allow their entry or admission, or subject 
them to possible expulsion.237  Of course, migration borders have never 
been fully coextensive with territorial borders as a literal matter.  Indeed, a 
longstanding cluster of legal fictions treats individuals as being “at the 
border” or seeking “entry” when they have been paroled into the United 
States or arrive at boundary points that, strictly speaking, are well within 
the country’s territorial limits.238  Like other nation-states, the United States 
also has long acted extraterritorially to prevent individuals from entering—
for example, by interdicting and turning away would-be migrants while 
they are still traveling to the United States through international waters.239  
Migration boundary points also typically exist within broader zones that of-
ten are treated as roughly equivalent, in varying degrees, to the actual 
boundary points themselves.240  Nevertheless, a powerful and commonplace 
narrative assumes that migration borders are and should be coextensive 
with territorial borders—as reflected in the very fact that the doctrinal 
principles that comprise entry-related legal fictions are understood as 
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“fictions” in the first place rather than simply as doctrinal nuances or 
complexities. 
However, in combination with immense expansions of immigration 
enforcement activities, immigration surveillance has hastened the 
detachment of migration borders from territorial borders.  On the one hand, 
the changes in rules and practices for use of drones along the U.S.-Mexico 
border, visa issuance, the Visa Waiver Program, preinspection and 
screening of travelers outside the United States, and pre-departure 
collection and analysis of travelers’ data from international carriers all 
seek—self-consciously and by design—to push the migration border 
extraterritorially outward.241  This objective long predates the 2001 terrorist 
attacks.  As volumes of cross-border traffic into the United States became 
considerably larger, officials began to implement extraterritorial screening 
mechanisms as a means of facilitating more efficient immigration and 
customs screening when individuals and goods arrived in the United 
States.242  Since the late 1990s, however, and especially since the 2001 
attacks, the expansion of extraterritorial migration and mobility screening 
mechanisms increasingly has been justified with reference to antiterrorism, 
national security, and public safety-related concerns—as seen in Congress’s 
explicit 2004 finding that “[t]he further away from the borders of the United 
States that screening occurs, the more security benefits the United States 
will gain.”243  DHS understands its own mission in precisely these terms: to 
“push[] our operational borders outward so that our physical borders 
become our last line of defense and not our first.”244 
On the other hand, the expansion of both direct and indirect post-entry 
enforcement simultaneously draws the migration border inward, self-
consciously constructing virtual, domestic border checkpoints throughout 
the country’s interior by identifying “events that are necessary for life in a 
modern society” where it may be possible to “exercise control” over 
individuals in a manner analogous to the control exercised at the territorial 
border.245  The particular approaches of these post-entry enforcement 
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initiatives vary considerably, and each one involves a distinct set of public 
and private actors—including law enforcement and criminal justice 
officials, but also welfare agencies, public hospitals and health agencies, 
motor vehicle licensing agencies, private employers, private landlords, and 
potentially others.  Collectively, however, these initiatives establish a kind 
of immigration panopticism, which eliminates zones in society where 
immigration status is invisible and irrelevant and puts this large array of 
public and private actors in the position of identifying individuals and 
determining immigration status; collecting, analyzing, and storing personal 
information; screening and identifying potential immigration law violators; 
and sharing information with federal immigration authorities.246  While 
these initiatives increase the likelihood of placing many individuals in 
removal proceedings, proponents place even greater emphasis on their 
ability to trigger a process they characterize as “self-deportation,” which 
disciplines potentially deportable noncitizens into internalizing the 
perception that their immigration status is constantly being monitored and, 
ultimately, into both revealing their status in a range of day-to-day settings 
and conforming to social expectations that they depart the country.247 
Far from being a clear, fixed line that is coextensive with the territorial 
border, the picture of the migration border that emerges is a worldwide, 
pointillist archipelago of layered boundary points, both fixed and mobile.  
New immigration surveillance technologies are what make this 
reconfiguration of the migration border possible.  To police this 
deterritorialized boundary, federal immigration authorities cooperate and 
coordinate with an enormous number of public and private actors—both 
within and outside the United States—to collect, analyze, store, and share 
biometrics and other personal information, to identify individuals, to 
monitor and control mobility, and in some instances to detain individuals or 
otherwise restrain their liberty.  Interoperable database systems help to 
create and make possible these broader assemblages, which “integrate and 
coordinate otherwise discrete surveillance regimes” in both “temporary 
configurations [and] in more stable structures”—thereby connecting and 
integrating the vast array of actors and institutions involved in immigration 
governance.248 
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This outward and inward projection of the U.S. migration border 
creates significant challenges to ensure transparency and accountability—
particularly as it has been accompanied by the outward and inward 
projection of the federal government’s policy objectives, priorities, and 
influence into a variety of other lawmaking and governance settings.  As the 
United States increasingly has emphasized the collection, analysis, 
management, and dissemination of information about migrants and 
travelers, it has actively cultivated the development of laws, institutions, 
and processes—both internationally and domestically—that are conducive 
to those immigration surveillance objectives.249  Internationally, for 
example, the United States has strongly advocated within international 
organizations for the implementation of interoperable global standards for 
machine-readable travel documents, e-passports, and computerized 
reservations system data formats that facilitate their use in the new 
information collection and analysis systems that the United States has 
instituted.250  The expanded collection, storage, and dissemination of API 
and PNR data by the United States has led to a series of clashes with the 
European Union—whose data protection regime places greater limits on 
collection and retention of this data than U.S. law—and ultimately to a 
series of E.U.-U.S. agreements that acquiesce to U.S. immigration 
surveillance practices.251  Congress also has required countries participating 
in the Visa Waiver Program to enter into a series of bilateral agreements to 
share information on individuals traveling to the United States, including 
antiterrorism watchlists, criminal history records, and lost and stolen 
passport information.252 
Domestically, the implementation of surveillance technologies in 
connection with the federal expansion of post-entry enforcement has given 
rise to a similar dynamic vis-à-vis states and localities.253  For example, 
even as the Obama Administration has proactively sought to restrain states 
from unilaterally undertaking some immigration enforcement activities, 
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such as Arizona’s SB 1070, it simultaneously has implemented automated 
immigration policing programs, such as Secure Communities, that 
effectively mandate state and local law enforcement collection and 
information sharing for immigration control purposes—thereby precluding 
states and localities from making affirmative, calibrated, and negotiated 
choices about the level of immigration policing assistance they wish to 
furnish, which they previously had greater latitude to make.  As with 
immigration surveillance initiatives that operate extraterritorially, the 
technological architecture of these programs shapes the institutional 
relationships among different actors involved in immigration governance, 
effecting end runs around affirmative state and local choices and 
complicating accountability.254 
To speak of the migration border’s detachment from the territorial 
border is not to suggest that the territorial border itself has lost significance 
for migration and mobility purposes.  To the contrary, even as the 
expansion of immigration surveillance has broadened the array of boundary 
points that comprise the migration border, both extraterritorially and 
domestically, the territorial border itself remains a site of ever more 
aggressive immigration surveillance and control.  As the massive border 
fortification investments perenially contemplated by leading immigration 
reform proposals indicate, demonstrating “toughness” in policing the 
territorial border continues to carry tremendous expressive and symbolic 
value for elected officials, quite apart from whether those measures actually 
succeed in controlling migration.255 
Still, an enormous and growing piece of the immigration control action 
is now found elsewhere.  It is not simply the case that the migration border 
of the United States is “everywhere,” although increasingly it is.256  In 
addition, with the implementation of immigration surveillance 
technologies—and the resulting projection of influence by the United States 
over lawmaking and governance, both internationally and domestically—a 
vast number of actors now contribute to the policing of that migration 
border at an effectively limitless number of boundary points around the 
world, which creates significant challenges in promoting transparency, 
consistency, and accountability among the many actors in that sprawling 
transnational network.257 
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B.  Automating the Migration Border 
With the proliferation of interoperable information systems, 
monitoring and controlling this deterritorialized migration border has 
become increasingly automated and semi-automated.258  By itself, 
automation is by no means inherently or necessarily harmful.259  To the 
contrary, at least conceptually automation can help to make government 
processes more efficient, effective, or fair.  For example, the use of 
machine-readable travel documents and the pre-departure collection of 
passenger data from international carriers helps to make immigration and 
customs screening processes upon arrival in the United States more 
efficient—which, as discussed above, was the original reason why U.S. 
officials began to collect that information from carriers in the first place.  
Defenders of CBP’s use of antiterrorism screening mechanisms such as the 
No Fly List, Selectee List, and ATS emphasize the role of these 
mechanisms in permitting agency officials to devote scarce resources to 
more intensive screening of travelers deemed to present the greatest risks.260 
In some instances, these automated and semi-automated systems seek 
to respond directly to concerns arising under their non-automated 
predecessors.  For example, proponents of E-Verify argue that automated 
employment eligibility verification may reduce opportunities for unlawful 
discrimination that exist under the existing non-automated employment 
verification regime.261  Similarly, proponents of automated immigration 
policing programs such as Secure Communities argue that by seeking to 
eliminate discretionary determinations by state and local police concerning 
whose immigration status should be investigated and verified, these 
programs, at least theoretically, reduce the incidence of errors based on 
police officers’ lack of knowledge of immigration law or invidious 
exercises of discretion on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.262 
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At the same time, automation and semi-automation present significant 
risks and concerns of their own.  Studies indicate that decisionmaking when 
using computerized systems can be distorted by automation complacency 
and automation bias, two related phenomena in which individuals place too 
much trust in the proper functioning of automated systems even when they 
suspect error or malfunction.  When these phenomena are at work, 
individuals may regard these systems as resistant to error, fail to sufficiently 
monitor their operation, or overtrust the answers, recommendations, and 
cues they provide.263  These risks may be exacerbated with large, complex 
networks of interoperable information systems like those used for 
immigration surveillance, since their proper utilization and maintenance 
present distinct challenges.  As Erin Murphy describes, government 
databases are the “ultimate collaborative projects,” often involving multiple 
systems and distributed collection, maintenance, access, analysis, and 
exchange of information among many different actors over extended 
periods of time.264 
In this context, inadequacies in the quality, accuracy, and relevance of 
information contained in the database systems used for immigration 
surveillance raise several distinct types of concerns.  First, large database 
systems invariably contain inaccurate, outdated, or irrelevant records, 
particularly as they grow larger and contain greater quantities of 
information.  Fair information principles emphasize that personal data in 
government databases should be accurate, complete, and current.265  For 
decades, however, “immigration authorities have been criticized for 
maintaining unreliable and inaccurate records and inadequately managing 
their information systems.”266  While some improvements have been made, 
these concerns have persisted. 
For example, E-Verify regularly issues tentative non-confirmation 
notices for a significant number of individuals, including both noncitizens 
and U.S. citizens, who in fact are lawfully eligible to work.267  Similarly, a 
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GAO analysis of Secure Communities found that ICE had no record of the 
criminal arrest charges for more than half of all individuals removed under 
the program during 2011 and the first half of 2012; other evidence indicates 
that a significant number of individuals are detained and placed into 
removal proceedings as a result of the program who ultimately prove not to 
be deportable.268  More recently, over one million immigrant families have 
experienced difficulties applying for health care coverage and insurance 
subsidies under the Affordable Care Act due to problems with verification 
of their immigration or citizenship status.269 
Second, when database systems are made interoperable and accessible 
to large numbers of actors, erroneous information can propagate widely and 
quickly and can become even more difficult to correct.270  Outside of 
immigration agencies, other databases that are relied upon for immigration 
surveillance purposes suffer from similar data quality problems.  For 
example, despite some recent improvements, criminal history records 
databases often remain inaccurate, inconsistent across states, and 
incomplete.271  Improper deprivations of liberty based on inaccurate 
information in these database records remain common.272  Observers also 
have documented large numbers of concededly innocent individuals whose 
names have been added to watchlists generated by the TSDB, such as the 
No Fly List and Selectee List, and inadequate mechanisms exist to remove 
names of innocent individuals from those lists.273 
Third, contrary to the connotations suggested by the term “database,” 
the use of these systems does not simply involve the retrieval and reliance 
                                                          
 268.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-708, SECURE COMMUNITIES: CRIMINAL 
ALIEN REMOVALS INCREASED, BUT TECHNOLOGY PLANNING IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED 22–23 
(2012). 
 269.  Letter from AFL-CIO, et al., to Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, Organizational Sign-On Letter to Improve Access to Health Insurance Under the ACA 
for Immigrant Families, July 31, 2014, available at http://ccf.georgetown.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2012/04/Advocates-SignOn-Letter-to-Burwell_Immigrant-Barriers-7-29-14.pdf; 
see also DINAH WILEY, IMPLEMENTING THE ACA FOR IMMIGRANT FAMILIES: CONSIDERATIONS 
AND CHALLENGES (2012); Alex Dobuzinskis & Curtis Skinner, Obamacare Enrollment by Lati-
nos Hurt by Immigration Law Concerns, REUTERS (Dec. 18, 2013), http://reut.rs/1dmy8ee. 
 270.  See JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, INTEROP: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF HIGHLY 
INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS 145 (2012) (noting that with increasing interoperability and connec-
tivity among complex systems, “harm can spread like contagion . . . [without] mechanisms to stop 
it.”); LYNCH, supra note 113, at 9.  
 271.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL 
HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2010, at 2–8 (2011); see James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration 
and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 387, 416–18 (2006). 
 272.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1512 (2012); Arizona v. Evans, 
514 U.S. 1, 27–29 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); United States v. Esquivel-Rios, 725 F.3d 
1231 (10th Cir. 2013); see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND 
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 46–47 (2004); Murphy, supra note 264, at 825. 
 273.  Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:06-cv-00545-WHA (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2014); 
Shane, supra note 134, at 815–19. 
 1/14/2015  12:10 PM 
2014] IMMIGRATION SURVEILLANCE 67 
of “factual” information, whether accurate or otherwise.  To the contrary, as 
discussed above, much of the information generated by these systems and 
relied upon by enforcement actors necessarily incorporates analysis, risk 
assessment, and the exercise of subjective and evaluative human judgments 
at some stage.  Those judgments may have been made directly, such as 
when individuals are identified for inclusion in the No Fly List, Selectee 
List, or other watchlists, or indirectly, as with the automated risk 
assessments made by systems like the ATS and CAPPS, whose evaluations 
and predictions are generated using algorithms that invariably embed 
human judgments, assumptions, fallibilities, and potential biases.274  
However, in either case, the nature of the data generated and distributed by 
government database systems—coupled with the opaque nature of the 
criteria for inclusion—can mask the subjective and evaluative judgments 
that underlie that information, making it seem more objectively factual to 
enforcement actors relying upon it than may be warranted.275 
Finally, the biometric identification technologies upon which 
immigration surveillance relies are not foolproof.  For example, although 
automated fingerprint identification systems can be extremely accurate in 
determining identity, they nevertheless can yield inaccurate results, owing 
to technological limitations, the quality of fingerprint recording processes, 
and even the particular demographic groups in which the subjects are 
members.276  Advanced multimodal biometric identification systems that 
are currently under development have limitations and fallibilities of their 
own.277 
All of these risks, limitations, and concerns might be more tolerable 
under circumstances in which database screening processes were merely 
one step in a fuller investigative process.  Indeed, even if it were 
hypothetically possible for database systems and biometric technologies to 
be perfectly accurate, consistent, and complete, well-functioning 
interoperability processes would still depend on competent and effective 
“human and institutional layers.”278  Officials emphasize that ATS, for 
example, “does not replace human decision making” but rather is simply a 
“decision support tool” that “assist[s] the border authorities in targeting 
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scarce inspection resources.”279  Similarly, when E-Verify generates a 
tentative non-confirmation for a would-be employee or ESTA denies a 
would-be visitor authorization to travel without a visa, those individuals are 
given opportunities to resolve the issue in person before any final denial of 
authorization is issued.  Over the long term, improvements in data quality 
and integrity might help to reduce the percentage of improper deprivations 
generated by these systems—as already seen to some extent, for example, 
with E-Verify.280 
The nature of immigration surveillance, however, limits the space for 
these human and institutional layers to function carefully and effectively—
and given the enormous scale of immigration surveillance activities, even 
small error rates can result in very large numbers of individuals facing 
improper deprivations that are often left unremedied.  While intended to 
eliminate improper discrimination, immigration surveillance mechanisms 
sometimes merely shift the point at which such discrimination takes place.  
With E-Verify, for example, employers often decline to hire individuals 
who receive tentative non-confirmations without properly notifying them—
depriving these workers of employment without any opportunity to resolve 
errors in database records.281  Similarly, even as Secure Communities seeks 
to preclude police from any direct immigration policing role after 
individuals have been arrested, it empowers police to arrest individuals for 
the very purpose of booking them and having their immigration status 
screened—without regard to whether that arrest leads to any criminal 
prosecution. Evidence to date suggests that in some jurisdictions, this is 
precisely what has happened.282  With both of these systems, evidence 
suggests that these types of errors and deprivations fall disproportionately 
upon particular communities.283 
Moreover, agencies involved in immigration surveillance are typically 
subject to limited oversight and deferential (if any) review.  Accordingly, 
those agencies have few incentives to ensure that the records contained in 
their database systems are accurate, complete, and current.  In addition, 
many of these systems are not governed or meaningfully constrained by any 
framework statutes.  While the Privacy Act of 1974 requires agencies to 
ensure that government records of personal information are accurate, 
relevant, timely, and complete, the statute only applies to systems of 
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records about U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents.284  Moreover, 
even for records on those categories of individuals, the statute permits 
agencies to exempt records concerning law enforcement or national security 
from its coverage.285  While some individuals have filed lawsuits 
challenging their improper inclusion in these database systems, the lack of 
transparency concerning the criteria and operations of these systems makes 
those legal challenges difficult.286  While more accurate database systems 
would better serve these agencies’ own interests, the incentives for 
immigration control, law enforcement, and national security agencies to 
devote the resources necessary to ensure the accuracy and integrity of these 
databases on their own, without external oversight, are limited.287 
In short, the combination of database errors, automation-related biases, 
complex but time-pressured decisionmaking, massive volumes of 
identification and screening activities, fragmented responsibilities among 
different authorities, and laws and agency incentives that are misaligned 
with the goal of ensuring data accuracy and integrity can easily result in 
large numbers of improper denials of immigration-related authorizations in 
a variety of different contexts. In many instances, these deprivations fall 
disproportionately on particular groups.288  Especially given the lack of 
transparency and oversight mechanisms in these systems, the limited 
procedural protections and access to counsel afforded to noncitizens at all 
stages of the migration process, and the limited protections for U.S. citizens 
who are outside the United States or seeking to enter, the consequences of 
these fallibilities can be significant and difficult to remedy. 
C.  Data Collection, Retention, and Secondary Use 
Quite apart from the accuracy and integrity of data in these systems, 
immigration surveillance raises the problem of “function creep”: the 
gradual and sometimes imperceptible expansion of surveillance 
mechanisms, once in place, for secondary uses beyond those originally 
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intended or contemplated.289  Fair information principles urge limits on the 
secondary use of information for purposes not specified when collected.290  
However, a lengthy list of examples demonstrates that such constraints are 
often lacking in the first place or difficult to maintain: the proliferation of 
surveillance camera systems to police a widening array of low level 
offenses,291 the expanding use of online tracking,292 the use of census data 
and voter lists to facilitate targeting of disfavored individuals or groups,293 
the expansion of DNA databases maintained by law enforcement to 
encompass rapidly widening categories of individuals and purposes,294 and 
the repurposing of various categories of identity documents and 
identification systems.295  Surveillance practices undertaken in the 
aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks have routinely morphed beyond the 
scope of their original antiterrorism purposes.  For example, the “fusion 
centers” established during the past decade to collect, analyze, and 
exchange terrorism-related intelligence information among law enforcement 
agencies almost immediately, and unapologetically, expanded the scope of 
their activities to encompass ordinary crimes.296 
By virtue of the enormous quantities of information that they collect, 
store, and disseminate—and the rapidly increasing ability to access and 
share that information among different public and private entities—the 
systems that comprise the surveillance infrastructure of immigration 
surveillance are particularly susceptible to secondary uses and function 
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creep.  The deployment of immigration surveillance systems and processes 
has taken place with very few constraints or limitations.  Data retention 
periods for the biometric, biographic, and other personal information in 
identification systems, travel and mobility control systems, and other 
databases used for immigration enforcement purposes are exceptionally 
long, and few limits constrain routine sharing of information among 
different agencies. 
Moreover, as the cost of storing information continues to decrease and 
the technological capabilities of these systems continue to improve, the 
number of possible secondary uses for these systems will increase even 
further—particularly given the premium placed on unconstrained 
information sharing.297  For example, the most recent enhancements to the 
FBI’s identification systems enable collection and storage of unparalleled 
quantities of biometric and biographic information from a variety of 
different sources, including multimodal biometric records of fingerprints, 
multiple photographs, iris scans, palm prints, voice data, and potentially 
other biometric identifiers along with detailed biographical information.  
Those systems also will be made fully interoperable with the other 
identification systems maintained by DHS and the Defense Department that 
comprise the “biometrics triad,” as discussed above.298  In connection with 
these enhancements, immigration authorities have begun to deploy systems 
in pilot programs that permit the identification of individuals without any 
need to review identification documents, using facial recognition and iris 
recognition technologies that compare biometrics captured in the field with 
information stored in multiple federal and state government databases.299  
Some of these systems also may enable remote identification of individuals 
without the need to be in their immediate physical proximity.300  Officials 
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also have piloted programs to collect other kinds of biometrics, including 
DNA from refugees in Africa seeking admission to the United States and 
noncitizens in immigration detention.301 
With database systems becoming increasingly sophisticated and 
interoperable, the pressures for expanded use of the information stored in 
these systems will continue to mount.  At the same time, with few 
limitations inhibiting them from doing so, immigration authorities might 
well seek even greater access to database systems maintained and held by 
federal, state, local, and even private entities for immigration control 
purposes.  However, even as the prospect of ever-widening uses of these 
systems highlights the importance of addressing those possibilities before 
particular surveillance mechanisms are widely implemented, the ability to 
do so can be elusive—particularly when those mechanisms have been 
deployed rapidly, with minimal transparency, under vague legal authority, 
and subject to limited external constraints.302 
V.  CONSTRAINING THE IMMIGRATION SURVEILLANCE STATE 
With the technologies and processes of the immigration surveillance 
state becoming a more durable part of the landscape of immigration 
regulation, much greater attention needs to be given to principles and 
mechanisms to constrain, inform, and guide their implementation and help 
limit the reach of the immigration surveillance state.303  In this Part, I 
identify and advance these principles and mechanisms.  My objective in this 
Part is not to present a detailed catalog of specific policy recommendations 
for the many different domains in which immigration surveillance activities 
now take place.  Instead, I aim to highlight principles and approaches, in 
more general terms, that should be considered across all of these many do-
mains, leaving specific prescriptions about particular initiatives for future 
work.  First, I analyze the traditionally undervalued individual and social 
interests at stake in the collection, processing, and dissemination of detailed 
personal information for migration and mobility control purposes.  Second, 
I argue against the persistence of border and immigration exceptionalism, 
which often results in a degree of deference to immigration surveillance 
activities that is excessive in relation to those interests.  Finally, I highlight 
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the importance of improving transparency, oversight, and accountability 
mechanisms when implementing these initiatives.  
A.  Protecting Information Interests in Migration, Mobility, and Travel 
Immigration surveillance demands reassessment of the interests at 
stake when personal information and travel history are collected, 
maintained, analyzed, and disseminated for purposes related to immigration 
control and the mechanisms to protect those interests.304  The proliferation 
of zones where immigration control activities take place—and where 
detailed information on individuals and their migration and mobility 
histories is collected and subsequently aggregated, stored, and 
disseminated—carries a range of social costs.305  While it is entirely 
appropriate to collect, maintain, and disseminate personal information for 
immigration control purposes in some contexts and subject to certain 
constraints, both individuals and society as a whole have legitimate interests 
in preserving zones in which these immigration surveillance activities do 
not take place and in making sure that when they do take place those 
activities are appropriately limited and constrained. 
To some extent, those interests are individual interests, stemming from 
the value of preserving individual anonymity or quasi-anonymity more 
generally and the individual harms that can result when individuals’ 
migration and mobility are routinely tracked and detailed information is 
maintained.306  But they also arise from a broader set of social concerns that 
surveillance and information privacy scholars have increasingly recognized 
as important.  These social interests—for example, preventing coercive or 
excessive aggregations of unrestrained government power—often have less 
to do with the particular information being collected in any given instance 
than with the harms that can arise from the means of surveillance and 
information management.307  In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has 
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signaled a willingness to give greater weight to these kinds of interests than 
they have traditionally received.308 
Vindicating these interests in the context of immigration surveillance 
therefore requires context-appropriate constraints on the collection, use, 
storage, and dissemination of personal information for immigration 
enforcement purposes—including robust limits on retention periods and 
secondary uses of information that were not originally contemplated.  To 
date, however, exuberance over the potential benefits of interoperable 
databases and other new technologies has clouded attention to the continued 
importance of these limits when implementing these systems for migration 
and mobility control purposes.  In an era in which more data is almost 
always assumed to be better, more information sharing and 
interconnectivity between database systems is also often assumed to be 
better as well.309  But as John Palfrey and Urs Gasser have emphasized, 
“complete interoperability at all times and in all places . . . can introduce 
new vulnerabilities” and “exacerbate existing problems.” Accordingly, they 
argue, placing constraints upon information sharing and interoperability and 
retaining “friction in [the] system” may often be more optimal.310 
B.  Ending Border and Immigration Exceptionalism 
Immigration surveillance sits at the intersection of several different 
doctrines that afford significant deference to government actors in border, 
migration, and mobility control. Under its border enforcement 
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has afforded federal officials 
considerable latitude to conduct immigration and customs enforcement 
activities.  This deference is strongest at the physical border itself, where 
the Court has deemed “routine,” suspicionless searches and seizures of 
individuals and property for purposes of enforcing immigration and 
customs laws to be per se reasonable, and therefore exempt from the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements, “simply by virtue 
of the fact that they occur at the border.”311  The Court has reached this 
conclusion with little explanation, often relying on conclusory statements or 
invocations of history and tradition with little more.312  In some instances, 
the Court has explicitly invoked and tied this “border exception” to the 
federal government’s power over immigration, which it has long deemed to 
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be plenary. In others, the Court has instead characterized border searches as 
falling within the categories of exceptions from ordinary Fourth 
Amendment limits for administrative or “special needs” searches.313 
In a world in which the migration border is effectively everywhere, 
policed by large numbers of actors other than federal immigration 
officials—and in which immigration surveillance activities reach large 
numbers of U.S. citizens and noncitizens with lawful immigration status—
the justifications for such sweeping deference become more difficult to 
maintain.  The categories of potential deprivations that can result from 
immigration surveillance activities have multiplied drastically beyond the 
simple ability to enter and remain in the United States.  With the expansion 
of the domains of enforcement and the tools of immigration surveillance, 
these enforcement activities can place restrictions on the rights to 
international and domestic travel, employment, education, social service 
benefits, and freedom from physical restraint in both the criminal justice 
and immigration enforcement processes.  As discussed above, the powerful 
tools of immigration surveillance create significant risks of erroneous 
deprivations and are easily susceptible for uses beyond those originally 
contemplated when implemented. 
Courts have slowly begun to recognize that significant interests are at 
stake in immigration surveillance activities for both noncitizens and U.S. 
citizens.314  However, these interests have continued to be given insufficient 
weight by Congress, which has exempted records of most noncitizens from 
the Privacy Act, and the executive branch, which has invoked the Act’s 
exemptions from its coverage for databases used for law enforcement and 
national security purposes.  Narrowing these exemptions in the Act’s 
coverage would enable these interests to be given the weight that they 
deserve, and ensure that any countervailing government interests are 
recognized and given effect only when supported by reasoned justifications. 
C.  Transparency, Oversight, and Due Process 
Finally, immigration surveillance demands greater attention to 
transparency, oversight, and accountability.  Whether programmatically or 
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in the context of individual adjudications, immigration agencies, although 
improving in some ways, have long suffered from major transparency and 
accountability deficits.315  Those deficits are amply evident in immigration 
surveillance initiatives and have been exacerbated by the blurred lines 
created by the deterritorialized migration border. Ensuring greater 
transparency, oversight, and due process requires responses at a number of 
different levels. 
First, a major contributing factor to the lack of sufficient transparency, 
oversight, and accountability has been the lack of sufficiently concrete or 
detailed legal authority to support and guide such major and complicated 
initiatives.  No framework statutes govern or constrain immigration 
surveillance activities, which, as discussed above, also fall outside of the 
limited privacy protections available under the Privacy Act.  This lack of a 
statutory framework governing surveillance activities that implicate privacy 
interests in migration, mobility, and travel data stands in marked contrast to 
other areas, such as communications and financial services, in which 
government access, storage, and dissemination of personal information 
have long been governed and constrained by framework statutes.316 
Whether coming from Congress, the executive branch, or both acting 
together, accountability and oversight of immigration surveillance would be 
better served by a more detailed, coherent legal framework governing 
immigration surveillance activities and opportunities for greater public 
engagement with those rules.  As the Markle Foundation has emphasized, 
new national security information sharing initiatives demand privacy and 
security protections that “address the hard questions [such as secondary use 
and redress] . . . as opposed to existing policies that state that agencies must 
comply with the law without providing guidance on how to do so.”317  
These observations hold true across the full range of initiatives in which 
immigration surveillance activities take place and will only become more 
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relevant as authorities continue to incorporate, upgrade, and integrate 
technology-based surveillance mechanisms in other aspects of immigration 
governance. 
Second, individual opportunities to redress harms arising from 
immigration surveillance activities, whether administrative or judicial in 
nature, can still play an important role—not only in remedying those 
individual harms, but also in creating incentives for DHS and other actors to 
ensure that information maintained in their database systems is accurate and 
complete.318  Current redress mechanisms, however, do not give sufficient 
opportunities for individuals to remedy improper deprivations.  While 
courts have begun to fill this gap, more robust and regularized redress 
mechanisms at the administrative level would create additional incentives 
for the authorities involved in immigration control to ensure the accuracy 
and integrity of their data. 
Finally, immigration surveillance demands more attention to forms of 
structural oversight.  Because of the necessarily opaque manner in which 
database systems and automated decisionmaking mechanisms often 
function—and the ways in which multiple actors are involved in their 
operation over extended periods of time—oversight of these systems can be 
particularly difficult in the context of individual cases.319  This is 
undoubtedly more true in the immigration enforcement system, which has 
traditionally been ill-equipped to supervise investigatory practices.320  
Given the limitations in the ability of individual redress mechanisms to 
fully ensure proper oversight of database systems, these systems raise the 
stakes in making sure that structural oversight mechanisms operate 
effectively.321  Especially as immigration surveillance integrates the 
institutions of immigration control with each other and with the institutions 
of other domains, the blurred lines of accountability among different 
institutions make accountability difficult; the implementation of automated 
immigration surveillance initiatives only blurs those lines further.322 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Technology, as Erin Murphy has explained, “alters—rather than just 
mechanizes—the relationship between the individual and the state.”323  
With the introduction of new surveillance and dataveillance technologies, 
the traditional relationships between individuals and the institutions of 
immigration control are being reconfigured in fundamental ways for both 
noncitizens and U.S. citizens alike.  And yet, compared to other aspects of 
the expansion of immigration enforcement, these shifts in migration and 
mobility surveillance have garnered exceedingly little attention, analysis, or 
concern—even as vigorous debates about surveillance and dataveillance by 
public and private institutions have emerged in other settings. 
These shifts have not simply contributed to a regime of mass 
enforcement, in which hundreds of thousands of noncitizens have faced 
detention and deportation. More fundamentally, the evolution of 
immigration enforcement institutions, practices, and meanings has also 
contributed to a more basic transformation of the nature of immigration 
governance—with implications for noncitizens and U.S. citizens alike.  By 
recounting and analyzing this transformation and its consequences, this 
Article highlights the need for scholars, advocates, policymakers, and other 
observers to devote greater attention and scrutiny to the onset of the 
immigration surveillance state and its rapid integration into the broader 
national surveillance state. 
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